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457 
Articles 
Glowing in the Dark: How America’s First 
Transgenic Animal Escaped Regulation 
Rebecca M. Bratspies* 
If you don’t want to scare the public, you’d better have an agency 
responsible, and you’d better have clear-cut rules, and you’d 
better mandate that they be followed . . . . We don’t have that.1 
 
One fish, two fish, red fish, blue fish 
Black Fish, blue fish, old fish, new fish.2 
 
The first commercially available transgenic3 (or genetically 
modified “GM”) animal went on sale in the United States on 
January 5, 2004.  The GloFish is an aquarium zebra danio 
(Brachydanio rerio) that was genetically engineered to glow in 
                                                          
 * Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law.  This paper has benefited 
from discussion at the CUNY Faculty Forum, and the World Aquaculture 
Society’s Aquaculture America 2005.  Special thanks go to Bill Taylor for 
suggesting this project and to Tracy Dobson, Ruthann Robson, B. Allen 
Schulz, and Donna Lee for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this 
paper, and to Laura Rabiee for research assistance. 
 1. Arthur Caplan, Chair of the University of Pennsylvania Center for 
Medical Ethics, as quoted in Gregory M. Lamb, GloFish Zoom to Market, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 22, 2004, at 15.  
 2. DR. SEUSS, ONE FISH TWO FISH RED FISH BLUE FISH 3-4 (1960). 
 3. The term “transgenic” refers to an individual with an introduced or 
novel genetic sequence integrated into its genetic makeup.  See FOOD AND 
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO), FAO GLOSSARY OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, at 
http://www.fao.org/biotech/find-formalpha-n.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).  
Typically this term refers to an organism that has genes from another 
organism inserted into its genome. That said, some scientists are conducting 
research into autotransgenic organisms—with addition copies of their own 
species’ genes inserted.  For a discussion of research involving autotransgenic 
organisms, see T.J. Pandian, Guidelines for Research and Utilization of 
Genetically Modified Fish, 81 CURRENT SCI. 1172 (2001), available at 
http://www.ias.ac.in/currsci (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
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the dark.4  This novelty fish is marketed in every state of the 
United States except California, where it is banned.5 
Given the significant public and scientific concerns about 
the safety and wisdom of this technology, one might have 
expected the first introduction of a transgenic animal to have 
been an event marked by the full pageantry of formal 
regulatory scrutiny.  For example, since the federal government 
has repeatedly announced that transgenic animals will be 
regulated as “new animal drugs” (NAD), one might have 
expected an especially rigorous approval process for the first 
such NAD introduced into interstate commerce.  Certainly one 
might have expected a thorough environmental risk analysis.  
While these expectations might have been reasonable, in this 
case the expectations would have been entirely wrong. 
Rather than engaging in heightened or even ordinary 
regulatory scrutiny, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
                                                          
 4. These fish are marketed for aquarium uses under the name Night 
Pearl Glo fish or TK-1 by Taikong Corporation of Taiwan.  See TAIKONG 
CORPORATION, SELECT VERSION, at http://www.azoo.com.tw/select.html (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2005).  For a skeptical discussion of these fish, see Andrew 
Pollack, So the Fish Glow, But Will They Sell?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at 5.  
In 2002, Taiwan became the first country to authorize sales of a genetically 
modified organism as a pet.  According to some reports, 100,000 of the glowing 
fish were sold in less than a month at $18.60 each.  See Fact Index, GloFish, in 
WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCOLPOEDIA, at http://www.fact-
index.com/g/gl/glofish.html (last visited February 24, 2005). 
 5. California law prohibits the import or sale of transgenic fish without a 
permit or an exemption.  See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 671 (2004).  Yorktown 
Technologies requested an exemption which the California Fish and Game 
Commission denied on December 3, 2003.  See California Blocks Sales of 
‘Glofish’ Pets, CNN.COM, Dec. 4, 2003, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/science/12/04/fluorescent.fish.ap/ (last visited 
February 24, 2005).  In March of 2004, the Commission voted 3-1 to seek an 
updated recommendation from the California Department of Fish and Game 
on whether GloFish should be granted such an extension, and to hold public 
hearings before making a final decision.  See Dan Thompson, California 
Reconsiders Nation’s Only Bio-Pet Ban, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2004, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2004-04-02-fishwife_x.htm (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2005).  To aid in its reconsideration, the Commission 
requested more detailed information from the Department.  During the 
Commission’s October 21, 2004 meeting, Agenda Item 10 was an “Update on 
GloFish Regulatory Timeline” given by the Department of Fish and Game.  
The Department reported that for an exemption, Yorktown would need to 
complete an environmental impact report as required by the California 
Environmental Quality Act.  Cal. Fish and Game Comm’n, Meeting Agenda, 
Oct. 21-22, 2004, at  http://www.fgc.ca.gov/2004/102104agd.html.  Included 
was testimony by Alan Blake of Yorktown Technologies.  Id.  Audio from that 
segment of the Commission meeting see 
http://www.fgc.ca.gov/2004/2004mtgs.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). 
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the lead agency for regulating transgenic animals, instead 
announced in 2003 that it would permit GloFish to enter into 
interstate commerce wholly unregulated.6  This decision not to 
regulate rested on a three sentence official statement in which 
the FDA announced that: 
[b]ecause tropical aquarium fish are not used for food purposes, they 
pose no threat to the food supply.  There is no evidence that these 
genetically engineered zebra danio fish pose any more threat to the 
environment than their unmodified counterparts which have long 
been widely sold in the United States.  In the absence of a clear risk 
to the public health, the FDA finds no reason to regulate these 
particular fish.7 
This announcement that the FDA would not to regulate 
GloFish meant that no federal agency was exercising any 
oversight over the first commercially-available transgenic 
animal. 
The usual pattern for a new technological innovation is 
intense regulatory scrutiny of the first market entrant, with 
follow-on products receiving either comparable treatment or 
relaxed scrutiny as the agency gains familiarity with the field.8  
Agencies tend to learn during the course of the first application, 
with later entrants being the beneficiaries of the learning 
curve.9  Instead, GloFish offers a textbook example of 
technological progress outpacing policy formation.  The 
regulatory vacuum GloFish revealed has sparked at least one 
                                                          
 6. FDA Statement Regarding Glofish, U.S. Food & Drug. Admin. (Dec. 9. 
2003), available at www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00994.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Glofish Statement]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. In the 1970s, scientists responded to growing concerns that 
biotechnology was developing more rapidly than was the ability to understand 
or manage the risks it posed by developing the Asilomar self-regulation plan.  
This plan was based on the conviction that standards of care “should be 
greater at the beginning and modified as improvements in the methodology 
occur and assessment of the risks change.”  Paul Berg et al., Asilomar 
Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188 SCI. 991, 991-92 (1975).  This 
same “go slow and learn from experience” model was certainly expressed in 
the rhetoric of the Coordinated Framework on Biotechnology.  See Coordinated 
Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,305 
(June 26, 1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework].  These principles 
continue to resonate powerfully in the context of transgenic fish. 
 9. For example, the USDA began simplifying its procedures for the 
introduction of certain genetically engineered plants after gaining experience 
with the crops.  See Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products: 
Simplification of Requirements and Procedures for Genetically Engineered 
Organisms, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,945 (May 2, 1997).  For the simplified procedures 
see 7 C.F.R. § 340.0 (2004). 
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lawsuit10 and has drawn condemnation from scientists and 
from the pet industry.11 
GloFish marked a momentous change in the status quo.  
No longer limited to the relatively controlled realm of 
experimental research, a transgenic animal is now freely sold 
in interstate commerce.  This watershed event is surely the 
harbinger of things to come—we can expect a future in which 
transgenic animals are regularly sold in commerce in the 
United States and around the world.  Proponents of other novel 
transgenic organisms are already claiming that the GloFish’s 
regulatory path sets a precedent for regulating transgenic 
organisms.12  Quite frankly, it was precisely that possibility 
that prompted this article.  A future peopled (so to speak) with 
transgenic animals may be inevitable, but there is still time to 
choose the conditions and circumstances under which it will 
unfold. 
Getting regulatory policy right is critical.  Only appropriate 
and consistent regulatory structures will ensure that this new 
technology is explored in a fashion that protects human health 
and the environment, while still encouraging innovation.  Since 
the FDA is currently considering a proposal to approve 
widespread aquaculture of transgenic salmon, the FDA’s 
approach to GloFish raises immediate and pressing concerns 
                                                          
 10. See International Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Thompson, No. 
1:04CV00063 (D.D.C. 2004).  Docket entries are available at 
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
 11. For example, PetSmart refused to carry GloFish, citing concerns about 
the long-term effects of genetic engineering on the fish themselves.  See 
Charles Q. Choi & Steve Nash, GloFish Draw Suit, THE SCIENTIST, Jan. 7, 
2004, available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20040107/01/ (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2005).  Similarly, the Ornamental Aquatic Trade Association 
labeled GloFish “an unwelcome addition to the marketplace,” and announced 
that transgenic fish have no place in the ornamental fish industry.  See 
Ornamental Aquatic Trade Association (OATA), Genetically Modified 
Ornamental Fish, at http://www.ornamentalfish.org/ 
aquanautstatement/gmfish.php (last updated Aug. 27, 2004).  Over eighty 
percent of the readers surveyed at Practical FishKeeping opposed GM 
ornamental fish.  See California to Reconsider GM Fish Ban, PRACTICAL 
FISHKEEPING, April 2, 2004, available at 
http://www.practicalfishkeeping.co.uk/pfk/pages/item.php?news=247 (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2005).  
 12. Simon Brodie, CEO of Allerca, Inc., contends that “[a]s long as people 
don’t start eating cats and they don’t enter the food chain, then we should be 
handled like the GloFish.”  Paul Elias, Invention Is Nothing To Sneeze at—
Non-allergenic Cat in the Works, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, available at 
http://www.suntimes.com/output/ news/cst-nws-cats28.html (last visited Mar. 
18, 2005). 
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about the environmental risks likely to flow from inadequate 
regulation of this new technology.13 
To explore this issue, Part I of this article provides a brief 
introduction to transgenic animals and the motivations behind 
this research.  Part II describes the New Animal Drug approval 
process and measures what the FDA actually did in the 
GloFish case against the statutory requirements for approving 
a new animal drug under the federal Food Drug and Cosmetics 
Act (FDCA).  Part III compares the FDA’s GloFish Declaration 
with the FDA’s responsibilities under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  Part IV makes the case 
that in its GloFish decision, the FDA inappropriately 
substituted “substantial equivalence,” an administrative policy 
developed to coordinate agency oversight of biotechnology, for 
the applicable statutory standards under the FDCA and NEPA.  
This section highlights some broader administrative and 
constitutional implications of the FDA’s decision.  Finally, Part 
V explores the possible fallout from this decision for the FDA’s 
pending consideration of a NAD application for transgenic 
salmon.  In particular, this section identifies some sui generis 
environmental concerns associated with aquaculture of 
transgenic salmon and considers what the FDA’s GloFish 
decision may tell us about the FDA’s willingness to fully 
consider these questions. 
I.  MAKING TRANSGENIC ANIMALS 
In just over a decade, genetic engineering (also called 
“genetic modification,” “GM,” or “biotechnology”) has emerged 
as a powerful tool for agricultural production.  By transferring 
genetic material from organism to organism, researchers can 
create wholly new, transgenic organisms.  Many transgenic 
agricultural plants have already been developed for use in the 
United States and elsewhere.  By 2004, the lion’s share of the 
soybeans, and significant percentages of the corn and cotton 
grown in the United States were transgenic varieties.14  There 
                                                          
 13. Opponents of biotechnology have raised a series of human health 
concerns associated with the proposed use of aquacultured transgenic salmon 
for food.  See, e.g., Janye Kay, 'Frankenfish' Spawn Controversy—Debate over 
Genetically Altered Salmon, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 29, 2002, at A4.  Those 
concerns are largely outside the scope of this article, which focuses on 
environmental issues. 
 14. The United States accounts for most of the genetically modified crops 
planted in the world and each year a larger percentage of the American 
BRATSPIES_FINAL_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:37:14 PM 
462 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:2 
 
has been a great deal of public controversy surrounding the use 
of these transgenic or genetically modified plants.15  Transgenic 
animals raise even greater public concern.16 
GloFish may be the first transgenic animal on the market, 
but there are many more waiting in the wings.  Applications of 
the technology range from the sublime to the frivolous.  
Researchers are currently experimenting with producing 
human blood proteins and other pharmaceuticals in transgenic 
pigs and other animals.17  Goats have been genetically modified 
to produce spider silk in their milk.18  Allerca, a division of 
Geneticas Life Science, is currently taking orders for 
transgenic, allergen-free cats.19  The central regulatory 
                                                          
harvest is comprised of GM plantings.  In 2004, GM soybeans accounted for 
85% of the soybean acreage planted in the United States; GM cotton for 76% of 
the cotton, and GM corn for 45% of the corn.  For these and other data 
pertaining to GM crops, see PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, 
AUG. 2004 FACTSHEET, GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(Aug. 2004), at http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/ 
display.php3?FactsheetID=2 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  The underlying 
data, as well as a wealth of other information on these crops are provided by 
the Economic Research Service of USDA at 
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB? 
navid=DATA_STATISTICS&parentnav=AGRCULTURE&navtype=RT (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2005). 
 15. There are many organizations and advocacy groups trying to restrict 
or prevent widespread adoption of these crops.  Among the most prominent 
are: The Center for Science in the Public Interest (http://www.cspinet.org/), the 
Union of Concerned Scientists (http://www.ucsusa.org/), Greenpeace 
(http://www.greenpeace.org/international_en/), and the Center for Food Safety 
(http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/home.cfm). 
 16. See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL SURVEY 
(Sept. 27, 2004), at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/2004update/ (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2005). 
 17. See David F. Betsch, Pharmaceutical Production in Transgenic 
Animals (Iowa State Univ., N. Cent. Reg’l Extension, Biotechnology 
Information Series (Bio-10), 2004), at http://www.nal.usda.gov/bic/ 
Education_res/iastate.info/bio10.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2005) (providing a 
list of some of the pharmaceuticals under development).  For an introduction 
to this issue geared towards the nonscientist see David Gillespie, Genetic Sci. 
Learning Ctr. at the Univ. of Utah, Pharming for Farmacueticals, at 
http://gslc.genetics.utah.edu/features/pharming/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). 
 18. See Christopher Helman, Charlotte’s Goat, FORBES, Feb. 19, 2001, at 
101; GM Goat Spins Web Based Future, BBC NEWS, Aug. 21, 2000, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/889951.stm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 19. Allerca’s website can be accessed at http://www.allercafoundation.org 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  A quick perusal of the site reveals a widespread 
animal cloning and genetic modification agenda.  Among the more bizarre 
projects is one called NIGHTSAVE which would implant jellyfish genes into 
deer to create transgenic deer with fluorescent hair and skin when illuminated 
by car headlights.  Although this last project seems like the beginnings of an 
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questions are real and immediate.  Product developers and the 
concerned public need to know that regulators will scrutinize 
these novel organisms under credible, consistent, and 
transparent standards designed to ensure human and 
environmental safety. 
A.  WHAT DOES “TRANSGENIC” MEAN? 
Legal discussions of biotechnology always begin with the 
requisite definition section.  I suspect that most readers stop 
there—few lawyers have training in the natural sciences and 
the jumble of words and concepts tend to leave readers longing 
for some nice straightforward antitrust or rule against 
perpetuities issues.  It is a real challenge to present an 
accessible introduction to the technology without 
oversimplifying to the point of absurdity.  Fortunately, lawyers 
are generally accounted to be quick studies.  In the spirit of 
informing without overwhelming, I offer a relatively simple 
introduction to the process of creating a transgenic fish and try 
to direct interested readers to more detailed sources of 
information. 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety20 provides a useful 
definitional starting point for a discussion of transgenic 
organisms (though for purposes of the Protocol, the equivalent 
term “living modified organism” or “LMO” is used).  Under the 
                                                          
internet hoax, Allerca’s CEO Simon Brodie, claims that the project is for real 
and only needs funding.  E-mail from Simon Brodie to Rebecca M. Bratspies 
(Jan. 14, 2005, 19:48:00 EST) (on file with author).  
 20. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety grew out of Article 19 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, which calls upon Parties to provide for the 
effective participation in biotechnological research activities and the sharing of 
its benefits and to consider a protocol on biosafety.  Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 19, 31 
I.L.M 818, 830 (1992), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2005).  The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted 
in January 2000.  Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: About the Protocol, available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/background2.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  
The Protocol was opened for signature from May 15, 2000 through June 4, 
2001 and received 103 signatures.  The Protocol entered into force on 
September 11, 2003, ninety days after receipt of the 50th instrument of 
ratification.  SECRETARIAT OF  THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY: FROM NEGOTIATION TO 
IMPLEMENTATION, available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/bs-
brochure-02-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  The full text of the Cartagena 
Protocol is available at www.biodiv.org/biosafety.  The Protocol currently has 
117 parties.  Id. 
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Protocol, a living modified organism is “any living organism 
that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained 
through the use of modern biotechnology.”21  “Modern 
biotechnology” is further defined to mean various laboratory 
techniques for introducing novel DNA into cells or organelles.22  
These techniques permit researchers to either physically or 
chemically transfer new genetic material from any organism to 
any other organism.  The principle criterion for being classified 
as a technique of modern biotechnology is that the technique 
“overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombinant 
barriers” that would otherwise prevent the genetic exchange.23  
Or, in plain English, biotechnology allows scientists to 
recombine genes themselves without regard for the biological 
constraints of sexual or asexual reproduction that ordinarily 
limit gene flow between organisms.  This transferred genetic 
material is the “transgene” in the term transgenic animal. 
B.  HAVEN’T WE BEEN GENETICALLY MODIFYING ORGANISMS 
FOR MILLENNIA? 
Farmers have certainly been genetically manipulating 
plants and animals since the dawn of agriculture.  Over the 
millennia, farmers developed animal husbandry techniques for 
selectively breeding livestock to enhance useful or desirable 
traits, or to suppress undesirable ones.  Selective breeding 
enabled farmers to exploit the variations naturally present 
within a species to develop new, more desirable strains.24  Over 
time, this process of selective breeding can produce a radically 
altered species.  For example, modern cows, pigs, goats and 
chickens, all produced through centuries of selective breeding, 
do not much resemble their wild counterparts and indeed are 
largely unable to survive in the wild.  Unlike modern 
biotechnology, however, selective breeding can enhance or 
suppress only those traits already present in a population.  No 
amount of selective breeding could transfer a spider gene to a 
                                                          
 21. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, Jan. 29, 2000, at art. 3(g), 39 I.L.M 1027, 1027 (2000), 
available at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/articles.asp?lg=0&a=bsp-03 (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  There is an additional requirement that the technique not be one 
used in traditional breeding or selection. 
 24. For an explanation of these points, accessible to the non-scientist see 
generally Feeding the Five Billion, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2001.  
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goat25 or a jellyfish gene to a zebra fish.26 
Modern biotechnology has expanded the process of genetic 
modification tremendously.  Functional genes can be isolated 
and transferred to an animal from any organism—across 
species, class, phylum and kingdom.  In other words, genetic 
engineering enables breeders to recombine genes themselves.  
This technology can create organisms that could not exist 
without such intervention. 
In many ways, the revolution of biotechnology “is pushing 
society into rethinking what we want out of agriculture.”27  
There are new possibilities for human intervention in the 
biological world that never before existed.  Most will agree that 
this new technology poses both risks and benefits.  
Unfortunately, in the vigorous public debate, advocates on all 
sides are tempted to obscure either the benefits or the risks in 
order to sway public opinion.  While it is certainly true that 
very few organisms that are part of the human environment 
have escaped human genetic modification, claims that modern 
biotechnology is somehow “more of the same” are often so 
simplistic as to border on the absurd.  Hyperbolic claims that 
biotechnology necessarily involves “playing god with nature,” 
are equally reductionist.  These intellectual shortcuts do little 
to further discourse and should be abandoned.  The public 
debate between supporters and opponents of biotechnology will 
certainly continue for the foreseeable future—there are genuine 
philosophical differences between the various camps.  
Moreover, the technology is far too new for us fully to 
understand its long-term costs and benefits.  That said, the 
extremes of the discussion seem totally out of step with how 
this transformative technology fits into a history of human re-
creation of the natural world. 
 
                                                          
 25. See GM Goat Spins Web of the Future, BBC NEWS,  Aug. 21, 2000, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/889951.stm (last visited Apr. 22, 
2005).  
 26. This is, of course, the genetic modification that gave rise to the 
GloFish.  For a detailed description of this process, see infra section I.C. 
 27. BRIAN JOHNSON, CONSULTIVE GROUP ON INT’L AGRIC. RESEARCH, 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS AND OTHER ORGANISMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
AGRICULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY AND BIODIVERSITY 131, at 
http://www.cgiar.org/biotech/rep0100/Johnson.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
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C.  WHY MAKE A TRANSGENIC FISH? 
Assuming that one intends to make a transgenic animal, 
there are many reasons to begin with fish.  It is an unfortunate 
fact that the success rates for creating transgenic animals are 
quite low—about ten percent.28  Out of every one hundred 
organisms subject to the biotechnology techniques described 
above, only about ten will be transformed, meaning they will 
integrate and express the transgene.29  And, expression of the 
novel genetic material is only the first step.  Researchers are 
looking for individuals that not only express the transgene 
themselves but also can pass it on to offspring generated 
through normal reproduction.  Altering the heritable genome is 
the ultimate goal of these laboratory processes.  A much 
smaller percentage (about one percent) of individuals 
expressing the transgene meet this test.30 
Because of these low success rates, two unique aspects of 
fish biology make fish a particularly attractive candidate for 
genetic engineering.  First, female fish produce eggs in the 
millions. This sheer fecundity makes it easy for researchers to 
obtain the large supply of eggs needed for experimentation 
purposes (egg availability is often a limiting factor in 
mammalian experimentation and is a concern frequently raised 
in the context of human stem cell research).31  Moreover, in the 
ordinary course, fertilized fish eggs develop outside the fish’s 
body—making in vitro cultivation of the newly modified 
organisms a simpler and cheaper prospect for fish than for 
                                                          
 28.  See John Beardmore & Joanne Porter, Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Aquaculture, FAO FISHERIES CIRCULAR NO. 989 3-8 (2003) 
[hereinafter FAO FISHERIES].   
 29. Techniques for creating transgenic organisms typically include 
microinjection, electroporation, use of microprojectiles and liposome mediated 
transformation.  Microinjection has been the preferred technique to introduce 
novel genetic material to fish egg.  See FAO FISHERIES, supra note 28, at 3-8.  
For a description, complete with diagrams, of the techniques of genetic 
engineering geared towards the lay reader, see PEW INST. ON FOOD & 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, FUTURE FISH: ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND REGULATION OF 
TRANSGENIC FISH 7-9 (2003), available at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/ 
fish/fish.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005) [hereinafter FUTURE FISH]. 
 30. See FAO FISHERIES, supra note 28, at 11. 
 31. See FUTURE FISH, supra note 29, at 4-5.  In January of 2004, just as 
GloFish were reaching stores, Japanese and United States researchers 
announced an innovative technique to genetically modify zebra fish using 
sperm cells grown in vitro, rather than eggs.  See Kayoko Kurita et al., 
Transgenic Zebrafish Produced by Retroviral Infection of In Vitro Cultured 
Sperm, 101 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1263, 1263-67 (Feb. 3, 2004). 
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mammals.  Together, the large supply of fish eggs and the 
relatively easy laboratory development of transformed eggs 
mean that experimentally transformed fish can be grown in 
large number. Experimental success is thus more likely. 
D.  GLOFISH: THE FIRST TRANSGENIC FISH SOLD IN INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE 
GloFish are the first transgenic animal to be sold 
commercially in the United States.32  Through genetic 
engineering, a research group at the National University of 
Singapore created GloFish by adding a gene for a red 
fluorescent protein from a sea anemone to conventional zebra 
fish.33  Thanks to this gene, the normally black-and-silver zebra 
fish glow bright red under black or ultraviolet light.  The 
Singapore laboratory that produced GloFish was engaged in 
research aimed at developing a biological system for pollution 
detection,34 but novelty aquarium use has become the 
commercial driver for production of GloFish. 
Texas-based Yorktown Technologies purchased exclusive 
international marketing rights for GloFish in early 2003.  
Through contracts with two large Florida purveyors of 
aquarium fish (5-D Tropical and Segrest Farms),35 Yorktown 
produces GloFish for commercial sale throughout the United 
States.36  In addition to the red GloFish currently on the 
market, Yorktown expects to market fluorescent green, orange, 
and yellow GloFish in the near future.37  While zebra fish are 
                                                          
 32. Zebra danao, which were modified to create GloFish, are a standard of 
laboratory research.  The genome of the fish has been well characterized, and 
can model many biological systems useful for research. 
 33. See Zhiyuan Gong et al., Development of Transgenic Fish for 
Ornamental and Bioreactor by Strong Expression of Fluorescent Proteins in the 
Skeletal Muscle, 308 BIOCHEMICAL & BIOPHYSICAL RES. COMM. 58, 58-63 
(2003). 
 34. See Nat’l Univ. of Singapore, Zebra Fish as Pollution Indicators, at 
http://www.nus.edu.sg/corporate/research/gallery/research12.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2005). 
 35. In Florida, aquaculture is big business, with farm gate receipts valued 
at $99 million in 2001.  See DIV. OF AQUACULTURE, FL. DEP’T OF AGRIC. AND 
CONSUMER. SERVS., 2003-2004 FLORIDA AQUACULTURE PLAN 3, available at 
http://www.floridaaquaculture.com/pub.atm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  
Tropical ornamental fish and plants are Florida’s most valuable aquaculture 
products and compose over 60% of the states aquaculture sales.  See id. at 9. 
 36. Eric Hallerman, GloFish, The First GM Animal Commercialized: 
Profits Amid Controversy, ISB NEWS REPORT, June 2004, at 
http://www.isb.vt.edu/articles/ jun0405.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 37. See Pollack, supra note 4, at 5. 
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quite inexpensive—each aquarium fish generally sells for 
around thirty-three cents—the fluorescent GloFish are priced 
between $5 and $15 each.38  Yorktown declines to make public 
its sales figures for GloFish,39 but newspaper reports indicate 
that in the weeks following their release, the company claimed 
to have sold tens of thousands of the transgenic fish.40 
E.  THE FOCUS OF RESEARCH 
Although this article takes GloFish as its starting point, 
transgenic ornamental fish are really a side note to the broader 
discussion of regulating transgenic fish.  The vast majority of 
research effort has been devoted to modifying high value food 
fish to make them better suited for aquaculture.  Currently, the 
fastest growing sector of aquaculture involves raising 
carnivorous fish for western markets.41  Many of aquaculture’s 
most vocal boosters are promoting aquaculture of transgenic 
fish.  It is this prospect of large-scale aquaculture42 of 
genetically engineered food fish, especially salmon and similar 
high-value carnivorous fish, that has the aquaculture industry 
salivating, and many policymakers scared. 
The first reports of the application of genetic engineering to 
                                                          
 38. See Dawn Fallilk, GloFish Filling Trendy Tanks, PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan. 
12, 2004, at A1. 
 39. Personal Communication from Yorktown Technologies (on file with 
author).  
 40. Chang Ai-Lien, GloFish Sparks off Classroom Study in US, STRAITS 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004. 
 41. See FAO FISHERIES, supra note  28, at 18. 
 42. Dwindling wild stocks and high market prices have made salmon a 
particularly attractive candidate for aquaculture.   K. Sandnes & A. Ervick, 
Industrial Marine Fish Farming, in SUSTAINABLE AQUACULTURE 97, 97 (N. 
Svennevig et. al. eds., 1999). By the late 1990s, salmon aquaculture was 
producing over 900,000 tons of fish per year.  See id.  In the United States 
alone, sale of carnivorous aquaculture products, largely salmon, has grown 
from $45 million in 1974 to over $1.1 billion in 2000, and is a $200 million 
euro business in the European Union.  See PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, 
NORTHERN AQUACULTURE STATISTICS 2000—YEAR IN REVIEW, at http://ocad-
bcda.gc.ca/enetresults2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2005); CENT. STATISTICS 
OFFICE IRELAND, FISHERIES STATISTICS 2002 (2003), at 
http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/ 
documents/agriculture/current/fishery.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). The 
United States Department of Commerce has publicly committed itself to 
building domestic aquaculture into a $5 billion industry by 2025—a five-fold 
increase from 2001 levels.  See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AQUACULTURE 
POLICY, at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ocs/ tradecommercial/DOCAQpolicy.htm 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2005).  
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fish appeared in the 1980s.43  Since then, there has been a 
burst of genetic modification activity in aquaculture research 
and development.  Indeed, by 1990, fourteen species of 
transgenic food fish had been produced in laboratories around 
the world,44 and in 2003, the FAO reported twenty-three 
aquatic transgenic species.45  The majority of the research and 
development efforts to date have focused on improving growth 
rates or efficiency of food conversion for salmon (and similar 
food fish) raised through aquaculture.46  Through insertion of 
additional copies of fish growth hormone (GH) genes,47 coupled 
with mammalian promoters, researchers have been able to 
accelerate fish growth rates, with modified fish growing two to 
eleven times faster than their non-modified counterparts.48  
Increased growth means that fish reach marketable size 
                                                          
 43. See N. Maclean & S. Talmar, Injection of Cloned Genes Into Rainbow 
Trout Eggs, 82 J. EMBRYOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL MORPHOLOGY 187, 187 
(1984); Z. Zhu et al., Novel Gene Transfer into the Fertilized Eggs of the 
Goldfish (Carassius acuratus L. 1758), 1 J. APPLIED ICHTHYOLOGY 31, 31-34 
(1984). 
 44. See A. R. Kapuscinski &  E.M. Hallerman, Implications of 
Introduction of Transgenic Fish into Natural Ecosystems, 48 CAN. J. 
FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 99, 100 (1991).  This figure does not include the use 
of transgenic fish as a research model within laboratories exploring basic 
biological questions, but only those modifications intended to alter traits to 
make fish more economical to grow, more nutritious, or otherwise more 
desirable to consumers and producers. 
 45. See FAO FISHERIES, supra note 28, at 3. 
 46. See id. at 2.  Creating transgenic fish with increased cold tolerance is 
a second area of significant research though to date the research has not been 
as successful.  For a chart of transgenic fish under development, see FUTURE 
FISH, supra note 29, at 6. 
 47. Different transgenes produce different rates of growth.  For example, 
use of an all-fish GH gene construct to make transgenic Atlantic salmon has 
produced a twofold increase of the transgenic fish growth rate.  See S.J. Du et 
al., Growth Enhancement in Transgenic Atlantic Salmon by the Use of an "All 
Fish" Chimeric Growth Hormone Gene Construct, 10 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 176, 
178 (1992).  Additionally, the use of ocean pout antifreeze promoter and 
salmon GH genes might produce up to a five-fold to thirty-fold increase in 
weight after one year of growth.  See  R.H. Devlin et al., Production of 
Germline Transgenic Pacific Salmonids with Dramatically Increased Growth 
Performance, 52 CAN. J.  FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 1376, 1381 (1995); See 
also R.H. Devlin et al., Transmission and Phenotypic Effects of an 
Antifreeze/GH Gene Construct in Coho Salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), 137 
AQUACULTURE 161, 167 (1995); R.H. Devlin et al., Brief Communication: 
Extraordinary Salmon Growth, 371 NATURE 209, 209 (1994). 
 48. See M.A. Rahman, & N. Maclean,, Growth Performance of Transgenic 
Tilapia Containing an Exogenous Piscine Growth Hormone Gene, 173 
AQUACULTURE 333, 334 (1999).  
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sooner, which reduces overhead costs for fish farmers.49  Under 
laboratory conditions, this increased growth rate has also been 
correlated with a significant increased efficiency in feed 
conversion.50 
The economic attraction of these modifications is obvious.  
Unfortunately, the very factors that make transgenic fish an 
attractive commercial prospect might also pose serious risks, 
not only to wild relatives but to whole ecosystems once these 
fish escape into the wild.  Unlike domestic farm animals, 
laboratory or farm raised fish easily become feral and compete 
with indigenous populations.51  Because of their novel 
characteristics, transgenic escapees could pose even greater 
threats to wild population than do conventional fish.  The 
negative consequences could be devastating. 
To date, the light regulatory scheme imposed on 
aquaculture has been wholly unable to resolve the escape 
problem, and fish farmers seem to treat escaped fish as a cost 
of doing business.  The magnitude of the escape problem 
prompted National Research Council (NRC) to call for caution 
in experimentation and commercialization of transgenic fish.52  
                                                          
 49. For charts documenting this increased growth rate, and a description 
of the commercial expectations of transgenic fish, see G. L. Fletcher et al., 
Transgenic Salmon: Potential  and Hurdles, PROCEEDING OECD WORKSHOP 
ON MOLECULAR FARMING HELD IN LE GRANDE MOTTE, FR.,. Sept. 3-6, 2000, at 
http://www.aquabounty.com/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). 
 50. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE-
BASED CONCERNS 89 (2002),  available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309084393.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) 
[hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH. COUNCIL]. 
 51. There is a growing body of evidence that escaped aquaculture fish are 
fully capable of establishing themselves in the environments to which they 
escape.  This phenomenon already poses ecological risks to wild salmon stocks.  
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 90-91.  Recent studies 
indicate that thirty to forty percent of the Atlantic salmon caught in the 
Northern Atlantic Ocean originated from farmed fish.  See L.P. Hansen et al., 
High Numbers of Farmed Atlantic Salmon, Salmo salar L, Observed in 
Oceanic Waters North of the Faroe Islands, 24 AQUACULTURE & FISHERIES 
MGMT. 777, 777 (1993).  In some parts of Norway, fish from farmed origins are 
the majority of animals captured.  See H. Saegrov et al., Escaped Farmed 
Atlantic Salmon Replace the Original Salmon Stock in the River Vosso, 
Western Norway, 54 ICES J. MARINE SCI., 1166, 1167 (1997).  On the east 
coast of North America, escaped farm salmon outnumber wild fish by as much 
as ten to one in some rivers.  See ATLANTIC SALMON FED’N, ATLANTIC SALMON 
AQUACULTURE: A PRIMER, at 
www.asf.ca/backgrounder/asfaquacbackgrounder.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 
2005). 
 52. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 92. 
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The NRC concluded that the many critical unknowns prevented 
an informed judgment about whether or how to proceed with 
commercialization of transgenic fish.53  In light of these high 
stakes, the relaxed, even inattentive, regulatory scrutiny the 
FDA applied to GloFish appears wildly inappropriate. 
II.  THE FEDERAL FOOD DRUG AND COSMETICS ACT IS 
A POOR FIT FOR REGULATING TRANSGENIC ANIMALS 
Under a 1986 executive policy known as the Coordinated 
Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology Products (the 
“Coordinated Framework”),54 many federal agencies jointly 
supervise the myriad uses and products of biotechnology in the 
United States.  The Coordinated Framework declared that 
biotechnology products would be evaluated under the same 
laws and processes used to review products produced without 
biotechnology.55  As a result, regulatory control over these 
products is allocated among various federal agencies based on 
each agency’s historical role under pre-existing statutes.56  
Three agencies, the USDA, the EPA and the FDA have primary 
regulatory authority over various aspects of biotechnology.  
These agencies have cobbled together a regulatory structure in 
which at least ten different pre-existing statutes regulate 
portions of this new technology.  Unfortunately, many 
transgenic organisms confound conventional regulatory 
categories.  To respond to the sui generis challenges posed by 
these genetically modified organisms (GMOs), regulators rely 
on increasingly creative interpretations of these existing laws.  
Transgenic animals are a case in point. 
Under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA claims 
primary regulatory authority over transgenic animals, 
including fish, by virtue of its “new animal drug” authority 
under the FDCA.57  The FDCA provides a comprehensive 
scheme to protect the public from drugs that may be unsafe or 
                                                          
 53. See id. 
 54. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 8 at 23,302. 
 55. See id. at 23,303. 
 56. For a critique of this regulatory scheme, see Thomas O. McGarity, 
Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 432-64 (2002).  See generally Rebecca M. Bratspies, 
Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 593 (2003).   
 57. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 
(2000).  See also Coordinated Framework, supra note 8, at 23,304. 
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ineffective for their intended uses.  As part of this scheme, the 
Act establishes a pre-marketing clearance system for new 
animal drugs (NAD).  No NAD may be introduced into 
interstate commerce unless the FDA has approved the New 
Animal Drug Application (NADA) for that drug.58 
The FDCA defines a new animal drug as “any drug 
intended for use for animals other than man, including any 
drug intended for use in animal feed . . . .”59  Drugs are further 
defined as products “intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body of man or other animals.”60  The FDA has 
interpreted this authority to reach transgenic fish on the theory 
that the transgene itself, and the protein for which it codes, 
affects the “structure and function” of the receiving animal in a 
manner analogous to that of a veterinary drug and can 
therefore be considered a new animal drug.61  It is beyond 
dispute that in drafting the FDCA, Congress never 
contemplated it being applied to such a situation.  Not only 
does the FDCA provide, at best, hazy authority for regulating 
animal biotechnology, but there are also serious questions 
about the FDA’s institutional capacity to address some of the 
potential hazards posed by transgenic animals.62 
 
                                                          
 58. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1) provides: 
(1) A new animal drug shall, with respect to any particular use or 
intended use of such drug, be deemed unsafe for the purposes of 
section 351(a)(5) of this title and section 342(a)(2)(D) of this title 
unless— 
(A) there is in effect an approval of an application filed pursuant to 
subsection (b) of this section with respect to such use or intended use 
of such drug . . . . 
A drug deemed unsafe under § 360b(a)(1) is considered adulterated under 21 
U.S.C. § 351(a)(5), and  adulterated drugs may not be introduced into 
interstate commerce.  See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). 
 59. See id. § 321(v).  
 60. See id. § 321(g)(1)(C). 
 61. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, CASE STUDY NO. I: GROWTH-
ENHANCED SALMON, CEQ/OSTP ASSESSMENT: CASE STUDIES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 13-14 [hereinafter 
CEQ/OSTP Study], available at http://www.ostp.gov/html/ ceq_ostp_study2.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2005) 
 62. For a concerned suggestion that the FDA’s current regulatory 
structures cannot effectively evaluate the environmental issues surrounding 
transgenic fish, see generally FUTURE FISH, supra note 29. 
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A.  THE FDA’S NEW ANIMAL DRUG AUTHORITY MAY NOT 
ENCOMPASS THE RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS 
Promising that the public’s interests will be fully protected 
in any decision to approve transgenic animals for general use, 
the federal government has assured the public that the FDA is 
fully prepared to regulate transgenic fish (ornamental as well 
as food fish) under the FDCA.63  The government has also 
expressed confidence in its ability to do so in a manner that will 
satisfactorily protect the environment.64 
However, the FDA’s casual dismissal of the environmental 
concerns surrounding GloFish tells a different story, one that is 
perhaps understandable in light of the FDA’s mandate and 
expertise to protect human food and drug supply but which also 
provides little comfort for those raising environmental 
concerns.65  The FDA’s authority is limited by the FDCA’s 
express purpose to protect American consumers from the risks 
of consuming unsafe or ineffective food and drugs.66  This 
purpose makes the FDCA an awkward fit for regulating 
ornamental fish like the GloFish or other “companion animals.”  
The FDA is predominantly concerned with questions of how 
consumption of NADs may affect human health.67  There is 
                                                          
 63. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 16.  It is the Center for 
Veterinary Medicine that is directly responsible for regulation of animal 
drugs, feeds and medical devices under the FDCA.  21 U.S.C. § 301.  For 
convenience, this article refers to the CVM and the FDA collectively as the 
FDA. 
 64. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 45.  Although this study claimed 
that it was not a definitive policy statement that created any rights, it seems 
evident that this document is the definitive statement of the Executive 
Branch’s approach to implementing the authority that Congress has delegated 
to it pursuant to various statutes.  Just as no federal agency would view itself 
as free to disregard the CEQ/OSTP study in favor of a more stringent or 
additional regulation for transgenic animals, the FDA ought not be free to 
waive sua sponte the regulatory requirements the administration has 
indicated it views as binding. 
 65. The FDA was created in 1938 following the tragedy surrounding 
sulfanilamide.  See Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATION 196-97 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).  Life saving 
sulfa drugs had just been discovered, and a company eager to market the drug 
in liquid form peddled sulfanilamide dissolved in diethylene glycol.  Id.  
Unfortunately, the solvent turned out to be toxic and killed more than one 
hundred people.  Id.  This incident underscored the need for pre-market 
regulation of drugs.  Id.; see also United States v. Sage Pharms, Inc., 210 F.3d 
475, 479 (5th Cir. 2000) (recounting history and explaining FDCA is “designed 
to ensure the nation’s drug supply is safe and effective.”) 
 66. 21 U.S.C. § 360b (2000). 
 67. 21 C.F.R. §§ 510, 514 (2004).  These sections govern new animal drugs 
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little room and even less incentive for the FDA to explore fully 
the many environmental concerns that might be raised by 
transgenic ornamental fish. 
Moreover, this same focus on human health that inhibits 
the FDA from adequately considering the problems posed by 
transgenic ornamental fish also poses significant barriers to the 
FDA’s ability to regulate other transgenic animals.  While the 
FDCA may give the FDA legal authority to regulate the food 
safety aspects of transgenic fish, the emerging consensus is 
that the bigger risk is that transgenic fish will make their way 
into the wild and pose a significant environmental threat.68 
The federal government claims that, as part of its safety 
assessment for a new animal drug, the FDA considers 
“environmental effects that directly or indirectly affect the 
health of humans or animals.”69  Advocates of biotechnology 
tout a 1998 FDA guidance document,70 directed at a wholly 
different set of products, as evidence that the FDA approval 
signifies consideration of a wide range of environmental harms 
including “lasting effects on ecological community dynamics” 
that fall within its consideration of activities that “significantly 
affect the quality of the human environment.”71  Unfortunately, 
this FDA guidance is limited to those situations in which 
“available data establish that there is a potential for serious 
harm to the environment at the expected level of exposure.”72  
                                                          
and new animal drug applications respectively and  focus much of their 
attention on residues in human food and threats to human health from these 
drugs. 
 68. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50. 
 69. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 14; see also 21 C.F.R. 25.15(b) 
(directing the FDA to consider whether a proposed action may seriously affect 
the human environment). 
 70. The emphasis on this tenuously related Guidance Document is part of 
a coordinated strategy.  For example, the identical document, 5 MYTHS ABOUT 
FEDERAL REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC FISH, is available verbatim from Aqua 
Bounty and from BIO.  See AQUA BOUNTY TECHS., 5 MYTHS ABOUT FEDERAL 
REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC FISH, available at 
http://www.aquabounty.com/5myths1.html and BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., 5 
MYTHS ABOUT FEDERAL REGULATION OF TRANSGENIC FISH, available at 
http://www.bio.org//animals/salmonmyths2.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).  
BIO is an ag-biotech lobbying group, and Aqua Bounty has a biotech company 
with a NAD for transgenic salmon currently before the FDA. 
 71. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICS APPLICATIONS 
6 (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1730fnl.pdf. 
 72. Id. 
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This guidance, even were it to apply to NADs, therefore is 
limited to situations in which data already exists and does not 
suggest that the FDA is willing to require applicants to develop 
such data or to investigate the possible ecological consequences 
of their proposed NADs. 
Moreover, the fact that the FDA could dismiss the first 
transgenic animal so lightly suggests that it would be a 
mistake to make too much of the language in this guidance 
document.  The government itself concedes that the FDA’s 
authority may not extend to all environmental impacts, 
particularly those impacts that are mainly felt by the 
ecosystem itself rather than by human beings.73  The limits 
inherent to the FDA’s regulatory mandate raise real questions 
about whether the FDA has enough flexibility and expertise to 
address the environmental and ecological issues unique to 
transgenic fish.  The FDA’s decision not to regulate GloFish 
certainly does nothing to generate public confidence that the 
FDA is attuned to the concerns of environmental protection. 
B.  THE FDA’S GLOFISH DECISION DID NOT SATISFY THE FDA’S 
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD DRUG AND 
COSMETICS ACT 
Under the FDCA, the promoter of a new product must file, 
and the FDA must approve, a new animal drug application 
before a new animal drug can be sold in interstate commerce.74  
Unless this application is filed, the FDA is statutorily 
mandated to deem the product “unsafe”75 and “adulterated.”76  
                                                          
 73. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 14.  The FDA clearly has some 
capacity to consider environmental harms.  For example, in approving 
recombinant bovine somatotrophin, (rBST) a bovine growth hormone produced 
via genetically engineered bacteria, the FDA expressly considered some 
environmental risks that the new animal drug might pose—namely changing 
land use patterns, water quality, carbon dioxide emissions and syringe 
disposal.  Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1186 (W.D. Wisc. 1995); see 
also CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 15 (listing other environmental risks 
examined in the rBST application, specifically, water quality, carbon dioxide 
emissions, and syringe disposal).  The environmental issues considered in 
Stauber were fairly directly related to human health concerns.  What is less 
clear is the FDA’s ability to consider ecosystem harms or damage to wild 
species—the primary environmental concerns raised by transgenic fish.  See, 
e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50 at 111; FUTURE FISH, supra 
note 29, at 11-26. 
 74. 21 U.S.C. § 360b (2000). 
 75. Id. § 360b(a)(1) (unless a NAD application is filed, new animal drugs 
shall “be deemed unsafe for the purposes of section 351(a)(5)”). 
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Adulterated products may not be sold in interstate commerce.77  
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) expressed the 
Executive Branch’s official intent to regulate transgenic fish, 
including ornamental fish, as new animal drugs.78  It therefore 
came as a surprise when, in its first foray into this regulatory 
thicket, the FDA decided that GloFish need not comply with 
any of these NAD regulatory procedures. 
The NAD application process is designed to force 
applicants to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of new 
drugs before permitting the drugs to be marketed.79  A drug is 
“new” if it has not been through an FDA approval process80 and 
is not generally recognized as safe81 and effective (GRAS).82  A 
new drug that is not GRAS and is not the subject of an 
approved NAD application nor falls under an effective 
investigational exception is adulterated, and, if the drug is 
introduced into interstate commerce, criminal prosecution may 
result.83  GloFish clearly qualify as an adulterated product 
under this standard.  GloFish were not approved through 
either a NAD application or an effective investigational 
exception.  Nor can GloFish qualify under the statute’s 
definition of GRAS.  Rather than apply the statutory 
                                                          
 76. Id. § 351(a)(5) (“A drug or device shall be deemed to be adulterated . . . 
if it is a new animal drug which is unsafe within the meaning of  section 360b 
of this title . . . .”) 
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) in relevant part prohibits “[t]he introduction or 
delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or 
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.”  Id. § 331(a).  There is no denying 
that GloFish are currently sold in interstate commerce. 
 78. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 16.  FDA advisory opinions and 
guidelines have the force of law and obligate the agency to follow them until 
amended or revoked.  21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85 (2004). 
 79. 21 U.S.C. § 360b; 21 C.F.R. § 514.1(b)(8). 
 80. 21 U.S.C. § 321(w). 
 81. Id. § 321(p)(2).  The Act requires the FDA to consider four specific 
factors when assessing safety: 1) the likelihood that the drug or a substance 
formed in food because of the drug will be consumed; 2) the cumulative effect 
that the drug will be likely to have on man or other animals; 3) safety factors 
that experts consider appropriate for extrapolating from animal 
experimentation data; and 4) whether it is likely that the conditions of use 
proposed or suggested in the labeling will be followed.  Id. § 360b(d)(2); 21 
C.F.R. § 514.111(a)(4). 
 82. Effectiveness must be demonstrated on the basis of “substantial 
evidence” that the drug “will have the effect is purports or is represented to 
have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
proposed labeling thereof.” 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(3). 
 83. Id. § 331(a). 
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standards, the FDA instead concluded that “[i]n the absence of 
a clear risk to the public health, the FDA finds no reason to 
regulate these particular fish.”84 
In doing so, the FDA turned the statutory burden of proof 
upside down. The FDCA does not require a “clear risk to public 
health”, nor indeed any evidence of threat, to trigger 
regulation.  On the contrary, the statute expressly requires 
evidence of safety before sale of a product can be approved.85  
Any drug not proven safe must be rejected and the burden of 
proof for demonstrating safety at all times rests squarely with 
the proponent of a new drug.86  Assumptions of safety have no 
place in this process. 
The Coordinated Framework assigns primary regulatory 
authority over transgenic animals to the FDA.87  In conjunction 
with the CEQ and OSTP, the FDA has already declared that 
transgenic fish will be evaluated as new animal drugs.88  The 
FDCA offers three options: a new animal drug is either 1) 
approved through the statutory process; 2) generally recognized 
as safe and effective (GRAS); or 3) an adulterated product 
subject to seizure.89  The first option is clearly inapplicable as 
the FDA did not approve GloFish through the statutory NAD 
process.  For the FDA to have been acting within its statutory 
mandate, the FDA’s GloFish declaration must, therefore, have 
been an assertion that GloFish satisfied the second statutory 
option and could be considered GRAS. 
C.  GLOFISH CANNOT BE CONSIDERED GRAS UNDER THE FDCA 
Courts have repeatedly held that a finding that a drug is 
“generally regarded as safe and effective,” (GRAS) requires 
evidence of “adequate and well-controlled investigations . . . to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved . . . .”90  Thus, a 
                                                          
 84. See Glofish Statement, supra note 6.  This decision rested primarily on 
a conclusion that “[b]ecause tropical aquarium fish are not used for food 
purposes, they pose no threat to the food supply.” Id. 
 85. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(w). 
 86. See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(b)(1) (listing the applicant’s required disclosures 
to the FDA). 
 87. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 8, at 23,309. 
 88. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text; 21 U.S.C. § 321(v). 
 90. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 
629-30 (1972).  Weinberger concludes that a GRAS determination must be 
based on the same substantial evidence standard that the FDA uses under 21 
U.S.C. § 360b(d)(3) to approve a NADA.  See id. at 613. 
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GRAS determination involves two steps.  First, there must be a 
showing of an expert consensus that the product is safe and 
effective; and second, the expert consensus must be based on 
“substantial evidence” as defined in the FDCA and in FDA 
regulations. Such a GRAS determination must be based on 
evidence published in the relevant scientific literature 91 and 
supported by a new drug application containing full reports of 
“adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show 
whether or not such drug is safe for use” under the likely 
conditions of its use.92  Anecdotal information (like testimony of 
physicians unsupported by controlled investigation or scientific 
publication) cannot constitute substantial evidence that a drug 
is GRAS.93  Drug purveyors have unsuccessfully attempted to 
substitute real world experience for those regulatory factors.94  
A controlled investigation and publication of the results are 
explicit statutory conditions that must be met before the FDA 
can conclude that a drug is GRAS. 
No such controlled investigation occurred with GloFish.  
No peer-reviewed publications support the safety of this novel 
organism.  Although Yorktown’s website does display “letters of 
support”95 from reputable geneticists, these letters have not 
been subjected to peer review and are not the product of 
controlled laboratory investigation.  As such, these letters are 
more akin to the anecdotal experience of physicians than to the 
kind of evidence sufficient for a GRAS determination. 
Under the plain language of the statute, GloFish therefore 
cannot be considered GRAS.  Indeed, the FDA does not make 
such a claim.  Instead, the FDA does something far more 
problematic—it implies into the statute a threshold question of 
whether the NAD is worthy of FDCA consideration. The FDA 
then claims sole and unreviewable discretion to determine 
                                                          
 91. See United States v. Pro-Ag, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (D. Minn. 
1991), aff’d, 968 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 92. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(A). 
 93. See United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Various Articles of 
Drug . . . Equidantin Nitrofurantoin Suspension . . . ., 675 F.2d 994, 1000 (8th 
Cir. 1982). 
 94. See United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Clear Plastic Bags of 
an Article of Drug for Veterinary Use . . . WRM-RID Dog Wormer, 963 F. 
Supp. 641, 645 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff’d, 145 F.3d 1335 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that a forty-three year “track record” was not sufficient to satisfy 
the substantial evidence requirement for a GRAS determination). 
 95. See Glofish, Glofish Fluorescent Fish Science, at 
www.glofish.com/science.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) (containing letters of 
support from five doctors). 
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whether its imputed threshold has been satisfied.96  With its 
GloFish decision, the FDA ripped a large hole in the regulatory 
net—a hole through which all transgenic ornamental fish, and 
quite possibly all pets, may escape.97  Indeed, proponents of 
other transgenic animals have already seized on GloFish as a 
precedent for how the FDA should approach non-food 
transgenic animals.  For example, Simon Brodie, CEO of 
Allerca Inc. and proponent of transgenic cats and deer, has 
been quoted as claiming that “[a]s long as people don’t start 
eating cats and they don’t enter the food chain, then we should 
be handled like the GloFish.”98 
III.  THE FDA DID NOT CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
The GloFish decision raises serious questions about the 
FDA’s capacity to properly consider the environmental concerns 
that surround other pending applications, including those 
associated with transgenic salmon. The FDA’s consideration of 
environmental safety was deeply flawed.  The FDA stated that 
“there is no evidence” that these genetically modified fish “pose 
any more threat to the environment than their unmodified 
counterparts which have long been widely sold in the United 
States.”99  Ordinarily, the FDA requires the proponent of a 
NAD to provide evidence of environmental safety rather than 
staying regulatory consideration absent evidence that the NAD 
                                                          
 96. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 27-29, International Tech. 
Ctr. v. Thompson, No. 1:04CV00062(RMU) (D.D.C. filed 2004) (giving the 
substance of its claim that the decision not to regulate GloFish is 
unreviewable), available at http://pacer/psc/uscourts.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 
2005).  
 97. For examples of genetic engineering applied to pets, see generally 
Doug Moe, Madison: Cat Cloning Capital?,  CAP. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, 
available at 
http://www.madison.com/tct/opinion/column/moe/index.php?ntid=13867&ntpid
=2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005); Kristen Philipkoski, RIP: Alba, the Glowing 
Bunny, WIRED, Aug. 12, 2002, available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/ 
0,1286,54399,00.html?tw=wn_story_related (last visited Mar. 21, 2005); Susan 
Rubinowitz, Glowing Rabbit Sparks Controversy, available at 
http://www.petplace.com/ Articles/artShow.asp?artID=1365 (last visited Mar. 
21, 2005); Genetic Savings & Clone, Inc., Missy: Our Inspiration, available at 
http://www.savingsandclone.com/about_us/ missy.html (last visited Mar. 21, 
2005). 
 98. See Elias, supra note 12. 
 99. Glofish Statement. supra note 6. 
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poses a threat to the environment.  Moreover, the FDA 
effectively excluded ornamental fish from any regulatory 
scrutiny by drawing its authority as narrowly as possible  and 
only covering those NADs that may pose a threat to the human 
food supply.100  Such an interpretation not only unduly limits 
the FDA’s authority under the FDCA, it also flatly contradicts 
the FDA’s duties under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).101 
A.  THE FDA FAILED TO COMPLY WITH NEPA 
NEPA’s central statutory purpose is to prevent agencies 
from disregarding environmental issues out of hand.102  To that 
end, NEPA regulations ensure that an agency takes a “hard 
look” at the effects of its actions.103  Section 1502.1 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations articulates this purpose with great 
particularity, establishing that the statement is meant “to 
serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the 
[environmental] policies and goals defined in the Act are 
infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal 
Government.”104  Agencies are compelled to collect and 
disseminate information about the environmental consequences 
                                                          
 100. In a lawsuit challenging this FDA decision not to regulate GloFish, 
the International Center for Technology Assessment and the Center for Food 
Safety have asserted that even under this narrow vision of its authority, the 
FDA had both the authority and a duty to regulate GloFish.  See Complaint, 
Int’l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Thompson, No. 1:04CV00062 (D.D.C. filed 
Jan. 1, 2004), available at 
http://64.78.7.168/pubs/GloFishComplaint1.14.2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 
2005) [hereinafter Thompson Complaint]; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, 
In the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Int’l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. 
Thompson, No. 1:04CV0006 (D.D.C. filed April 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.Ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov [hereinafter Defendants’ Motion]. 
 101. See generally National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 
4321-4370(f) (2000). 
 102. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321; Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 
360, 371 (1989) (“NEPA promotes its sweeping commitment to ‘prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere’ by focusing Government 
and public attention on the environmental effects of proposed agency action.”) 
 103. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (identifying NEPA purposes as including “[t]o declare a national 
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man 
and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate 
damage to the environment and biosphere . . . to enrich the understanding of 
the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation . . . .”).  
For an interesting critique of NEPA, see generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333 (2004). 
 104. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2004). 
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of proposed actions that fall under their respective 
jurisdictions.105  Similarly, the broad dissemination of 
information mandated by NEPA permits the public and other 
government agencies to react to the effects of a proposed action 
at a meaningful time.106 
To achieve these ends, NEPA requires agencies to conduct 
environmental reviews on all “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”107  NEPA’s implementing regulations define a 
“major federal action” as an action to include those actions 
whose effects “may be major,”108 and to cover any “circumstance 
where the responsible officials fail to act.”109  NEPA’s 
implementing regulations further define “effects” and “impacts” 
to be synonymous and both terms are interpreted broadly to 
include federal actions raising “ecological . . . aesthetic, historic, 
cultural, economic, social, or health [concerns] whether direct, 
indirect, or cumulative.”110   
Agencies use the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
process to implement this environmental review requirement.  
Each EIS must include “any adverse environmental effects 
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented,”111 and NEPA regulations direct agencies to use 
their best efforts to “avoid or minimize any possible adverse 
effects”112 and to explore alternatives “that will avoid or 
                                                          
 105. See id. § 1502.1; 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
 106. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (establishing the timing requirements for 
environmental impact statements and emphasizing that the “statement 
should be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an 
important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to 
rationalize or justify decisions already made.”). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
 108. See Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1022 (9th Cir. 
2003) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18).  A coalition of consumer groups sued the 
FDA on January 14, 2004, challenging the agency’s GloFish decision as a 
failure to regulate.  In its filings in this litigation, the FDA has defended its 
actions by asserting that its GloFish decision was not an agency action, and/or 
was not a major federal action.  See Defendants’ Motion, supra note 100.  The 
circularity of this claim is striking.  Approval of a NAD is clearly a federal 
action triggering NEPA review.  CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 14.  The 
FDA used substantial equivalence to conclude that a NAD was unnecessary, 
and then bootstrapped the lack of a NAD as grounds not to invoke NEPA. 
 109. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. 
 110. Id. § 1508.8. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii). 
 112. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(f). 
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minimize adverse effects.”113 
Twenty years ago, the D.C. Circuit enjoined the National 
Institute of Health (NIH) from approving the deliberate release 
of genetically engineered organisms without first conducting an 
environmental assessment.114  The NIH had approved the 
deliberate release of ice-minus bacteria without conducting an 
environmental assessment or an environmental impact 
analysis under NEPA.  Writing for the majority, Judge J. 
Skelly Wright concluded that the NIH has failed to display “the 
rigorous attention to environmental concerns demanded by 
law.”115  He pointed out that NEPA would be toothless if 
agencies could satisfy their NEPA obligations merely by issuing 
conclusory statements that actions producing significant 
changes of the status quo, like the first deliberate release of a 
genetically modified organism, would have no environmental 
impacts.116  Reading NEPA as the product of a special 
congressional concern with the effects of new technology on the 
environment,117 the concurring opinion reasoned that release of 
genetically engineered organisms needed a level of scrutiny 
sufficient both to ensure safety and to reassure the public.118  
Although NEPA has been reinterpreted over the years, this 
basic core remains. 
The FDA’s announcement that it would not regulate 
GloFish unleashed the first commercial distribution of a 
transgenic animal in the United States and raises eerie 
parallels to the NIH’s earlier attempt to permit the ice-minus 
experiment with no assessment of environmental risks.  The 
FDA’s decision not to regulate (and therefore to permit 
marketing of GloFish) was not based on any environmental risk 
assessment process.  The FDA conducted no EIS, produced no 
                                                          
 113. Id. §1500.2(e).  
 114. See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985). 
 115. Id. at 146. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 147.  The court noted that NEPA explicitly enumerates “new 
and expanding technological advances” as one of the activities with the 
potential to threaten the environment.  Id. (quoting  42 U.S.C. §4331(a) 
(2000)).  The court further emphasized that the legislative history reveals a 
concern with “[a] growing technological power . . . far outstripping man’s 
capacity to understand and ability to control its impact on the environment.”  
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-296 at 6, (1969)). 
 118. See id. at 161 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). 
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Environmental Assessment (EA),119 and made no findings that 
GloFish were likely to have no significant impact (FONSI).120  
In short, none of the investigative and contemplative steps 
required under NEPA were performed and no governmental 
agency considered whether unregulated sale of GloFish would 
have negative environmental impacts. 
This failure is particularly troubling because commercial 
production of these fish will inevitably lead to release of some 
proportion of these fish into the wild.121  Indeed, dumping of 
unwanted aquarium fish and plants is a primary source of 
invasive species.  The FDA’s three sentence opinion plainly 
dismissed out of hand all the complex questions surrounding 
this kind of intentional release.  While many aquarium fish, or 
ornamentals, do not survive in the waters of the United 
States,122 there are, unfortunately, ample examples of such fish 
not only surviving but reproducing and competing with native 
species.123  
                                                          
 119. Under NEPA, an initial EA is used to determine if an in depth EIS is 
needed.  See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(C) (2004).  If required, an EIS examines the 
long and short-term environmental effects from the proposed action and 
alternative actions that could be taken. See id. § 1502.1.  Although NEPA 
imposes no substantive burden on agency decision making, it does require 
procedural protections chiefly intended to prevent agencies from ignoring 
environmental concerns in their decision making.  See generally id. § 1502. 
Here the FDA seems to have undercut NEPA by operating on a “no news is 
good news” principle. 
 120. By contrast, Canadian authorities have seized GloFish, classifying 
them as illegal because the fish have not gone through an environmental risk 
assessment.  See Leanne Dohy & Hanneke Brooymans,  GloFish Sales Halted 
By Feds: Genetically Modified Species Raises Health Fears, CALGARY HERALD, 
Feb. 15 2004, at A11.  Somewhat ironically, Singapore Agri-Food and 
Veterinary authorities have seized Glofish imported from Taiwan.  See Chang 
Ai-Lien, NUS Glofish To Be Sold in the US . . . But Not Here, STRAITS TIMES, 
Dec. 10, 2003. The fish developed by a Singapore laboratory are not approved 
for sale in Singapore and importers are threatened with jail terms and 
thousands of dollars in fines.  Id. 
 121. See Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
Got Fish? Already Tired of that Holiday Gift Aquarium? Think Before You 
Dump and Create an Even Bigger Problem (Jan. 25, 2001), available at 
http://www.usgs.gov/public/press/ public_affairs/press_releases/pr1381m.html 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  See generally U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. 
DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NON-INDIGENOUS AQUATIC SPECIES DATABASE, 
available at http://nas.er.usgs.gov/default.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). 
 122. See Stephen Hsu, Taikong Corporation Leader in Marine 
Biotechnology, TAIWAN NEWS, Sept. 28, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 
7441444.  
 123. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 42 (acknowledging that 
intentional and unintentional release of non-native aquarium fish have 
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At the time of this writing, no permanent zebra fish 
populations exist in United States waters.  However, invasive 
populations of Zebra fish have been documented in California, 
Florida, New Mexico, and Connecticut.124  In all cases, the 
invasive species were traced back either to aquarium releases 
or to escapes from commercial fish breeding sites.125  There is 
certainly no reason to believe that GloFish would escape or be 
dumped less often than their unmodified kin.126  Moreover, 
since some purveyors claim that transgenic zebrafish can 
survive in waters much colder than those in which zebrafish 
are usually found, there is no assurance that genetically 
modified zebrafish could not survive in American waters.127  
Yorktown admits that its GloFish are fully fertile, and indeed, 
at least one homebreeder has succeeded in not only breeding 
GloFish but also in crossing GloFish with other kinds of 
zebrafish.128   
                                                          
already led to severe environmental problems in the United States, with 
nearly 150 exotic ornamental fish found in the wild in the United States); see 
also Letter from American Ecosystem and Exotic Species Research Scientists, 
Attachment:  Nonindigenous Organisms in the Aquarium Industry that Have 
Been Released into U.S. Waters, to Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt (Oct. 
19, 1998) (on file with author) (regarding invasive species and characterizing 
zebra danao as “established in the wild in the United States outside its native 
range”); Dianna K. Padilla  & Susan L. Williams, Beyond Ballast Water: 
Aquarium and Ornamental Trades as Sources of Invasive Species in Aquatic 
Ecosystems, 2 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENV’T, 131-38 (Apr. 2004) (concluding 
that one-third of the world’s worst invasive species are ornamental aquarium 
species). 
 124. Leo Nico & Pam Fuller, Brachydanio rerio, in NONINDIGENOUS 
AQUATIC SPECIES DATABASE (revised July 22, 2003), at 
 http://nas.er.usgs.gov/queries/FactSheet.asp?speciesID=505; see also Decl. of 
Susan L. Williams at 2-3, Int’l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Thompson, No. 
1:04CV00062 (D.D.C. 2004) [hereinafter Williams Decl.], available at 
http://pacer/psc/uscourts.gov (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).  
 125. See Williams Decl., supra note 124, at 2.  
 126. Zebrafish are a popular research species for genetic engineering, 
making this question a pressing one.  For example, researchers have recent 
demonstrated the possibility of producing human coagulation factor VII in 
zebra danios and tilapia.  See generally Gyulin Hwang et al., Fish as 
Bioreactors: Transgene Expression of Human Coagulation Factor VII in Fish 
Embryos, MARINE BIOTECH., Oct., 2004, available at 
http://springerlink.metapress.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2005). 
 127. See Hsu, supra note 122.  Unlike Yorktown, Taikong claims to sterilize 
ninety percent  of its transgenic fish—a rate that it describes as “good 
enough.”  Needless to say, this assessment of safety is strongly challenged by 
opponents of the technology. 
 128. See PFK Reader Breeds GM Fish, PRACTICAL FISH KEEPING, Mar. 2, 
2004, available at 
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Complex as this question is in the United States, it pales in 
comparison to the possible risks when aquarium fish are sold in 
their center of origin.  Zebra fish, for example, are native to the 
Indian subcontinent.129  The aquarium trade is an 
international one, and the FDA’s actions make it likely that 
these fish will be sold into their center of origin in the relatively 
near future. If the FDA, the agency charged with regulating 
these transgenic fish does not consider this point, will anyone? 
Even though release or escape of GloFish into the wild 
might have significant ecological impacts, nobody has 
evaluated these impacts.  With this decision, the FDA has 
loosed into the metaphorical streams of commerce a transgenic, 
highly mobile organism with no consideration of the likely 
environmental effects the fish will have on the actual streams 
of the nation.  And, as GloFish pass through the stream of 
commerce, these fish will inevitably enter the nation’s streams 
and waters.  One expert characterizes the situation as one in 
which regulators were “caught unaware by [the GloFish] . . . 
and it went forward and went commercial very quickly.”130 
The FDA’s NEPA regulations are drafted extremely 
narrowly.  The FDA does not require its scientists to consult 
with experts from other agencies and FDA scientists, though 
highly skilled, are not experts in population biology or 
ecology—the disciplines raising the biggest questions about 
transgenic fish.  Even more troubling, the FDA’s regulations 
categorically exclude from NEPA assessment all NAD 
applications for drugs intended for use in nonfood animals.131  
There might be some comfort in the fact that this categorical 
exclusion does not apply under exceptional circumstances,132 
but concerns remain.  The FDA’s casual dismissal of the 
unknowns swirling around GloFish suggests that the FDA’s 
interpretation of “exceptional circumstances” is likely to be very 
                                                          
http://www.practicalfishkeeping.co.uk/pfk/pages/item.php?news=220 (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2005) 
 129. Zebrafish Info. Network, Univ. of Or. Inst. of Neuroscience, Zebrafish 
K-12, Zebrafish FAQs, available at 
http://www.neuro.uoregon.edu/k12/FAQs.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2005). 
 130. Gregory Lamb, Glofish Zoom to Market, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Jan. 22, 2004 (quoting Eric Hallerman, Professor of Fisheries and Wildlife 
Science, Virginia Tech University), at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0122/p14s02-sten.html (last visited Apr. 24, 
2005). 
 131. 21 C.F.R. § 25.33(d)(1) (2004). 
 132. Id. § 25.15(d). 
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narrow.133 
The fact that the FDA did not invoke this categorical 
NEPA exemption for GloFish provides only cold comfort.  First, 
the FDA’s decision that GloFish need not be subject to the 
FDA’s regulatory authority is in many ways even more 
troubling.  Second, the FDA’s language in dismissing GloFish, 
with its clear emphasis on human health, suggests that the 
FDA is unlikely to explore these environmental questions fully 
or to engage in any effective NEPA analysis of transgenic 
aquarium fish or other non-food transgenic animals.134  Thus, 
some of the most serious potential impacts of transgenic 
animals135—including harm to wild populations through 
competition or erosion of genetic diversity with the attendant 
decrease in community resilience—would appear to fall outside 
the government’s own characterization of its authority.  This is 
the result despite a growing body of scientific evidence 
suggesting that transgenic animals could involve dimensions of 
risk not present for unmodified animals.136  Responsible 
regulatory oversight must consider the environmental effects of 
transgenic animals, including released transgenic ornamental 
                                                          
 133. The FDA’s general NEPA regulations require that any application for 
a categorical exemption, like that for non-food animals, must be accompanied 
by a statement that “to the applicant’s knowledge, no extraordinary 
circumstances exist.”  Id. § 25.15(a). 
 134. The FDA is already under fire for routinely ignoring the 
environmental effects of persistent pharmacological compounds in the 
environment.  See Andrew C. Revkin,  F.D.A. Considers New Tests for 
Environmental Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A20.  See generally Dana 
W. Kolpin et al., Pharmaceuticals, Hormones and  Other Organic Wastewater 
Contaminants in U.S. Streams, 1999-2000: A National Reconnaissance, 36 
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1202 (2002) (demonstrating the environmental effects). 
 135. Serious concerns also surround transgenic animals, including 
questions of whether these animals can safely be part of the food chain and 
whether genetic manipulations are fair to the animals themselves.  That said, 
the most immediate worries are environmental.  See, e.g., James Gorman, 
When Fish Flouresce, Can Teenagers Be Far Behind?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, 
at F3; Andrew Pollack, Gene-Altering Revolution Is About to Reach the Local 
Pet Store: Glo- n-the-Dark Fish, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at A12; see also 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOLOGICAL CONFINEMENT OF GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED ORGANISMS 48 (2004), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309090857/html/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
 136. See, e.g., W.M. Muir & R.D. Howard, Fitness Components and 
Ecological Risk of Transgenic Release: A Model Using Japanese Medaka, 158 
AM. NATURALIST, 1 (2001); W.M. Muir & R.D. Howard, Possible Ecological 
Risks of Transgenic Organism Release When Transgenes Affect Mating 
Success: Sexual Selection and the Trojan Gene Hypothesis, 96 PROC.  NAT’L. 
ACAD. SCI. 13,853-56 (Nov. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Muir & Howard, Possible 
Ecological Risks]. 
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fish before any more such fish are sold in the aquarium 
trade.137 
IV.  THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK VERSUS 
STATUTORY MANDATES 
When regulating biotech food crops, the FDA treats 
genetically modified foods as “substantially equivalent” to their 
conventional counterparts.138  Substantial equivalence is a 
term from the Coordinated Framework139—the Executive 
Branch policy document generated in the mid-1980s.140  
Pursuant to the Coordinated Framework, the FDA presumes 
the safety of novel chimeric foods and regulates only if there is 
evidence that a genetically modified food produces a risk 
different from those posed by its unmodified cousins.141   The 
FDA’s failure to fulfill its statutory mandates with regard to 
transgenic fish grows from a misapplication of this same notion 
of substantial equivalence.  Indeed, misplaced notions of 
substantial equivalence ring out loudly from the FDA’s 
statement that: “[t]here is no evidence that these genetically 
engineered zebra danio fish pose any more threat to the 
environment than their unmodified counterparts which have 
long been widely sold in the United States.”142 
                                                          
 137. Indeed, under Executive Order 13,112, each federal agency is 
required: 
3) not authorize, fund, or carry out actions that it believes are likely 
to cause or promote the introduction or spread of invasive species in 
the United States or elsewhere unless, pursuant to guidelines that it 
has prescribed, the agency has determined and made public its 
determination that the benefits of such actions clearly outweigh the 
potential harm caused by invasive species; and that all feasible and 
prudent measures to minimize risk of harm will be taken in 
conjunction with the actions. 
Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6,183-84 (February 3, 1999).  Needless to 
say, the FDA has neither determined nor made public any such analysis. 
 138. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 22,984, 22,985 (May 29, 1992).  See also Draft Guidance for Industry: 
Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been 
Developed Using Biotechnology, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839-42 (Jan 18, 2001).  For an 
interesting insider perspective that is critical of the Coordinated Framework, 
see Sen. Al Gore, Planning a New Biotech Policy, 5 HARV. J. L & TECH. 19 
(1991). 
 139. See generally Coordinated Framework, supra note 8. 
 140. Id. at 22,302.    
 141. Id.  
 142. See Glofish Statement, supra note 6. 
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In drafting the Coordinated Framework, the Reagan 
Administration considered whether new statutory authority 
would be necessary to respond to the challenges posed by 
developments in molecular biology.143   The Administration 
concluded that existing authority could adequately protect the 
public from harm from these new technological 
developments.144  The Coordinated Framework thus represents 
an Executive Branch policy of treating the products of new 
techniques for genetic modification as the “substantial 
equivalents” of their unmodified counterparts.  As the 
“substantial equivalents” of conventional products, the fruits of 
genetic engineering needed no special regulatory regime.  Thus, 
“substantial equivalence” became the touchstone for 
integrating evaluation of genetically modified products—plants, 
animals, and microbes—into a matrix of pre-existing regulatory 
statutes. 
In its GloFish decision, the FDA proceeded squarely within 
this “substantial equivalence” paradigm.  The products of 
biotechnology and genetic engineering are presumed to be safe, 
and the burden of proof rests with anyone desiring to challenge 
that presumption.  Unfortunately, this deferential substantial 
equivalence vision of regulation conflicts head on with the kind 
of assessment the FDA is required to perform under the FDCA.  
Because the FDA’s GloFish decision had the effect of 
introducing a new animal drug into interstate commerce, it is 
reviewable under the federal law,145 just like all other FDA 
decisions to permit NADs to enter interstate commerce.  
Although the standard of review is deferential, an agency 
decision may be set aside if it is arbitrary and capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.146  In announcing that it would not regulate GloFish, the 
FDA implicated all of these grounds. 
A.  SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE UNDERMINES THE FDA’S 
ABILITY TO REGULATE TRANSGENIC ANIMALS UNDER THE NEW 
ANIMAL DRUG ACT 
A close look at the language the FDA used in its 
declaration raises warning flags that the FDA discarded the 
                                                          
 143.  See Coordinated Framework, supra note 8, at 23,302-03.  
 144. See id. 
 145. See 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2004); see also id. §§ 551-59, 701-06. 
 146. Upjohn Mfg. Co. v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1982); see 
also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
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relevant statutory factors, and replaced them with the principle 
of substantial equivalence articulated in the Coordinated 
Framework.  Such an application is misplaced.  The FDA has 
already announced that transgenic animals contain new animal 
drugs that must be regulated in accordance with the FDCA.  
These animals are thus inherently different from, rather than 
the “substantial equivalent” of unmodified animals that do not 
contain new animal drugs and are, therefore, not subject to 
that portion of the FDCA. 
Resort to substantial equivalence is entirely inappropriate 
for assessing the safety of new animal drugs.  As explained 
earlier, the FDCA does not give the FDA authority to grant 
waivers from the NAD process, unless the drug is GRAS.147  
The GRAS process is very specific—little is left to agency 
discretion.  The FDA deviated from these statutorily prescribed 
processes for evaluating new drugs, and instead applied the 
Framework’s notion of “substantial equivalence.”  This 
“substantial equivalence” approach led the FDA to substitute 
assumptions of equivalence for statutorily-mandated proof that 
the transgenic fish is generally regarded as safe and 
effective.148 
Rather than applying its statutory authority as delegated, 
the FDA, in effect, created an additional threshold question: 
whether the NAD is the “substantial equivalent” of its 
unmodified counterpart.  The FDA thus assumed for itself the 
power to grant waivers from the NAD process whenever it 
concluded that “substantial equivalence” has been satisfied.  
Since under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA is already 
                                                          
 147. For a vigorous academic analysis of the limits on waivers in an 
administrative system, see Jim Rossi, Making Policy Through the Waiver of 
Regulations at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 
255, 277-78 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: 
Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an 
Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163 (1984); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 
Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 
1982 DUKE L.J. 277 (1982). 
 148. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that agency action will be improper if the agency 
relies on factors which “Congress has not intended it to consider” and fails to 
consider statutory factors); Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(concluding that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority when 
he failed to consider statutorily required factors before issuing a directive); 
Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (reversing agency decision because court concluded that administrator 
had permitted the administration’s policies to supplant statutorily identified 
objectives for decision making). 
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committed to the conclusion that the products of genetic 
engineering will be the “substantial equivalent” of their 
unmodified counterparts,149 this imputed threshold question 
may well eviscerate the FDA’s statutory duty to regulate NADs 
under the FDCA. 
At the very least, applying a “substantial equivalence” 
standard to GloFish involved unacceptably shifting the burden 
of proof from the purveyor of a NAD to prove safety to those 
objecting to the drug to demonstrate danger.  In drafting the 
FDCA, Congress created a presumption against marketing or 
sale of a product, unless the product’s proponent demonstrated 
a requisite level of safety is demonstrated.150  The FDA seems 
to have used “substantial equivalence” to stand this 
legislatively-imposed burden of proof on its head. 
Where the statute declares anything not proven safe to be 
adulterated and therefore illegal, the FDA announced that it 
would regulate GloFish only if presented with evidence of 
harm.  In doing so, the FDA contradicted its public 
pronouncements that transgenic animals would be regulated as 
NADs, and instead claimed a hidden, case-by-case discretion to 
determine whether a transgenic animal qualifies as a new 
animal drug.  The GloFish decision thus replaced the NAD 
default that marketing of a product be permitted only after 
safety has been demonstrated with the Coordinated 
Framework’s presumption in favor of marketing the products of 
biotechnology in the absence of evidence of unique dangers. 
B.  SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE UNDERMINES THE FDA’S 
ABILITY TO CONDUCT A NEPA ANALYSIS 
Like other federal agencies, the FDA has duties under 
NEPA to ensure that its “policies and programs will be 
planned, developed, and implemented to achieve the policies 
declared by NEPA and required by the CEQ’s regulations to 
ensure responsible stewardship of the environment for present 
and future generations.”151  The FDA’s use of “substantial 
                                                          
 149. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 8, at 22,302.  
 150. The FDCA places the responsibility squarely on the sponsor of a drug 
to demonstrate that drug’s safety, and directs the FDA to approve for 
marketing only those drugs whose safety has been demonstrated.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).  This allocation of responsibility ensures that any 
significant uncertainty about safety or effectiveness is to be borne by a drug’s 
sponsor not its consumer. 
 151. 21 C.F.R. § 25.10(a) (2004). 
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equivalence” as a reason not to engage in a NEPA analysis of 
GloFish raises serious concerns about how the FDA will 
approach the environmental effects of transgenic fish that do 
not qualify for the categorical exclusion.  The FDA’s NEPA 
regulations make it clear that the FDA need not duplicate its 
efforts by re-analyzing under NEPA factors that were already 
considered under the NAD.  With regard to transgenic fish, 
however, there are likely to be significant environmental issues 
not encompassed by a NAD evaluation. 
Rather than engage in the proper NEPA process, the FDA 
relied on “substantial equivalence” to conclude that its actions 
fell outside the scope of NEPA.  With no evaluation of the likely 
or possible environmental effects attendant on sale of GloFish, 
the FDA merely assumed that transgenic fish are the 
“substantial equivalent” of conventional zebra fish, and then 
further assumed that this substantial equivalence meant that 
GloFish posed no risk to the environment.  These assumptions 
fly in the face of a significant body of scientific scholarship 
detailing the various behavioral and survival differences 
between conventional fish and their genetically altered 
counterparts152 and do not account for claims that transgenic 
zebrafish can survive under a broader range of temperature 
conditions than their unmodified counterparts.  In relying on 
“substantial equivalence,” the FDA also ignored significant 
regulatory concerns identified by the National Research 
Council153 and by the FDA itself when it initially asserted this 
authority.154 
C.  SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE RAISES SEPARATION OF POWERS 
CONCERNS 
The FDA’s GloFish decision represents a serious departure 
from the generally accepted structure of constitutional action 
                                                          
 152. See generally R.H. Devlin et al., Increased Ability to Compete for Food 
by Growth Hormone-Transgenic Coho Salmon Oncorhynchus kisutch 
(Walbaum), 30 AQUACULTURE RES. 479 (1999); José de la Fuente et al., 
Growth Regulation and Enhancement in Tilapia: Basic Research Findings and 
Their Applications, 15 GENETIC ANALYSIS 85 (1999); Anne R. Kapuscinski & 
Eric M. Hallerman, Implications of Introduction of Transgenic Fish into 
Natural Ecosystems, 48 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 99 (1991); William 
M. Muir & Richard D. Howard, Assessment of Possible Ecological Risks and 
Hazards of Transgenic Fish with Implications for Other Sexually Reproducing 
Organisms, 11 TRANSGENIC RES. 101 (2002). 
 153. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 108-21. 
 154. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 21 
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for co-equal branches of government.  The FDA impermissibly 
replaced its NAD statutorily-mandated decisional matrix with 
an executive policy position.  Agencies cannot overrule 
Congress by administrative fiat.155  An agency is entitled to 
make decisions based on its view of wise policy but only within 
the parameters of the authority delegated to it by Congress.156  
Importing the Coordinated Framework’s already problematic 
concept of “substantial equivalence” into the GloFish decision 
undermines the statutory foundation upon which the 
administrative policy of substantial equivalence was built.157   
An administrative policy intended to direct evaluation of 
GM products into an existing statutory rubric instead became a 
means for avoiding application of that very same statutory 
rubric.  By shifting primary lawmaking authority from 
Congress to the Executive Branch, this use of the Coordinated 
Framework circumvents the FDA’s statutorily created 
mandates and abrogates critical limitations on the scope of the 
FDA’s delegated authority under both FDCA and NEPA. 
Using executive policy to trump not one, but two statutory 
mandates implicates significant separation of powers concerns.  
Coupled with the executive’s assertion that its GloFish decision 
is entirely unreviewable, the consequences would be the 
Executive Branch creating, implementing, and reviewing its 
own authority with no input or constraints from the co-equal 
branches of government.  With this decision, the potential for 
arbitrary agency behavior has skyrocketed, and unfortunately 
so has the likelihood of irreversible environmental harm. 
 
 
                                                          
 155. For a speech by then Assistant General Counsel of the FDA making 
this point, see Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 177, 179 (1973). 
 156. Even Heckler v. Chaney, which in many ways represented the high 
point for court findings that agency decisions were unreviewable, clearly 
intended that agency discretion be limited by the statutory mandate.  Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).  See also Ronald M. Levin, 
Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 
752-62 (1990). 
 157. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. 488 U.S. 204 (1988) 
(agency power is limited to the authority delegated by Congress and 
regulations must be issued within the power conferred by the legislature); 
Federal Mar. Comm’n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255, 258 (9th 
Cir. 1964) (agency freedom to regulate is limited by the Congressional intent 
expressed in the agency’s enabling statute). 
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V.  THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISKS POSED BY AQUACULTURE158 OF TRANSGENIC 
SALMON 
The FDA’s GloFish decision calls into question both the 
scope of the FDA’s authority to consider ecological impacts of 
transgenic salmon and its willingness to exert whatever 
authority it might possess.  Regardless of the dubious merits of 
the FDA’s NEPA and NAD assertions with regard to GloFish, it 
is clear that approval of transgenic salmon, or the approval of 
other transgenic food animals, would be a major federal action 
subject to NEPA and require a NAD.  While this technology 
seems to hold tremendous promise, it cries out for a regulatory 
scheme to maximize the likelihood that transgenic fish are 
raised and marketed in a fashion that protects public welfare.  
The FDA’s disregard, in the context of GloFish, of the very 
environmental considerations that will be raised by commercial 
aquaculture of transgenic salmon does not engender confidence 
that the FDA is willing to engage in the necessary inquiry.  As 
a result, there is a significant possibility that important 
environmental concerns will not find their way into the 
regulatory decision making process.  Meanwhile, commercial 
pressures on the FDA to approve transgenic fish are mounting. 
A.  SOME DETAILS OF AQUA BOUNTY’S TRANSGENIC SALMON 
The FDA is currently considering an application submitted 
by Aqua Bounty Farms159 for what would be the first permit to 
grow a transgenic animal commercially for food.160  Aqua 
                                                          
 158. There is a large and growing body of scholarship documenting the 
adverse environmental effects of aquaculture generally.  That topic is beyond 
the scope of this article which focuses on the unique environmental challenges 
posed by aquaculture of transgenic fish.  Readers interested in aquaculture 
more generally should see Rosamond L. Naylor et al., Effects of Aquaculture on 
World Fish Supplies, 405 NATURE 1017 (2000); FAO Fisheries Dep’t, Review 
of the State of World Aquaculture, FAO FISHERIES CIRCULAR No. 886 (1997), 
available at http:www.fao.org/docrep/003/w7499e/ w7499e00.htm (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2005); MICHAEL L. WEBER, SEAWEB AQUACULTURE CLEARINGHOUSE, 
WHAT PRICED FARMED FISH: A REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
COSTS OF FARMING CARNIVOROUS FISH (2003), available at 
http://www.seaweb.org/resources/sac/pdf/WhatPriceFarmedFish_high.pdf.  
 159. The firm is now known as Aqua Bounty Technologies, Inc. 
 160. The FDA has not posted the application, nor has it been published in 
the federal register.  That said, Aqua Bounty officials talk freely about their 
application and their hopes for the transgenic salmon they call AquAdvantage.  
See, e.g., PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, ONE FISH, TWO FISH, 
GENETICALLY NEW FISH (Nov. 13, 2003), available at 
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Bounty has requested that its transgenic salmon be approved 
under the same NAD authority putatively exercised in the 
FDA’s decision not to regulate GloFish.  Aqua Bounty 
genetically modifies its salmon by microinjecting a transgene 
construct consisting of an ocean pout AFP promoter linked to a 
chinhook salmon GH cDNA.161  This transgene construct 
enables the fish to produce growth hormone year round, rather 
than only during the spring and summer.  As a result, Aqua 
Bounty’s transgenic fish should increase in weight up to six 
times faster than nontransgenic salmon.162  The company 
acknowledges that escaped transgenic fish may pose significant 
risks to wild salmon populations and more generally that sea 
pen aquaculture is associated with negative environmental 
consequences.163  Aqua Bounty has spent years working with 
regulators and with the concerned public to confront these 
challenges in a way that makes commercial and environmental 
sense. 
But for Aqua Bounty’s voluntary public disclosure of its 
application, however, the Trade Secrets Act164 would have 
prevented any public participation in the decision making 
process.165  The Trade Secrets Act similarly prevents the FDA 
from discussing whether any other applications have been filed 
for approval of other transgenic fish.166  As a result, the public 
                                                          
http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/summaries/ display.php3?NewsID=543; 
Bettina Metzler, Mathias Schmidt, and Eckhard Stein, eds., 
Commercialization of Path-Breaking Transgenic Salmon Faces Stumbling 
Blocks (Apr. 5, 2000), available at 
http://www.netlink.de/gen/Zeitung/2000/000405h.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2005); see also  CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61; Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Altered 
Salmon Leading Way to Dinner Plates, but Rules Lag, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 
2000, at A1; UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED 
SALMON (Feb. 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_environment/biotechnology/page.cfm?pageID
=327 (last modified July 18, 2003) 
 161. Erik Stokstad, Engineered Fish: Friend or Foe of the Environment?, 
297 SCIENCE 1797, 1797 (2002). 
 162. Id. at 1799. 
 163. G.L. Fletcher et al, Current Status of Transgenic Atlantic Salmon for 
Aquaculture, in PROCEEDINGS OF 6TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE 
BIOSAFETY OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS, available at 
http://www.aquabounty.com/abbounty.htm (last visited April 10, 2005).  
 164. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000).  The Trade Secrets Act requires that the FDA 
keep secret all of the investigations and pre-market notifications that precede 
the release of a new animal drug, including whether or not any such petition 
exists.  Id. 
 165. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000).   
 166. Id.  
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has no idea how many applications for transgenic animals are 
pending.  The National Research Council has expressed its 
serious concern about the consequences of excluding the public 
from this process, 167 particularly in light of the explicit 
provisions for transparency and public participation in NEPA’s 
environmental assessment process.168 
Aqua Bounty has voluntarily provided the information that 
it has submitted many of the scientific reports required for a 
NAD approval.169  The company deserves credit for its 
willingness to provide the public this information that it could 
legally keep secret.  However, depending on the kindness of 
strangers, so to speak, is no way to build a regulatory system.  
The FDA acknowledges that this duty of secrecy creates a clear 
conflict with NEPA170—a conflict moreover that prevents the 
FDA from fulfilling its NEPA duty to ensure a public airing of 
significant environmental impacts. 
B.  ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS POSED BY AQUACULTURE OF 
TRANSGENIC SALMON 
Salmon aquaculture, even of non-transgenic salmon, is 
already quite controversial, with many scientists claiming that 
aquaculture endangers the survival of wild salmon.171  
                                                          
 167. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 111; FUTURE FISH, 
supra note 29, at 52. 
 168. Indeed, in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, the D.C. Circuit 
specifically acknowledged the importance of public participation before 
permitting deliberate release of genetically modified organisms.  756 F.2d 143, 
146 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 169. Interview with Eliot Entis, CEO of Aqua Bounty (Oct. 2004) (on file 
with author).  
 170. CEQ/OSTP Study, supra note 61, at 16. 
 171. One primary environmental concern with regard to aquaculture is the 
effect that escaped fish have on wild fish populations.  This problem is 
discussed more fully in section 3, infra.  Aside from escapees, the process of 
aquaculture itself raises some serious environmental concerns.  For example, 
aquaculture sea pens freely discharge salmon feces, fish feed and other organic 
wastes into the aquatic environment.  This typically results in excess nitrogen 
and phosphorous loads in the immediate vicinity of the sea pens.  This 
nutrient overloading causes eutrophication problems.  See Sena S. De Silva, 
Feed Resources, Usage and Sustainability, in SUSTAINABLE AQUACULTURE 
221-42 (1999).  Underneath every fish pen is a footprint or “dead zone”—a 
shadow of oxygen depleted and contaminated sediment.  United States Pub. 
Interest Research Group v. Heritage Salmon, Inc. at 4-7, No. 00-150-B-C (D. 
Me. filed Feb. 19 2002), available at 
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/opinions/kravchuk/2002/MJK_02192002_1-
00cv150_ USPISG_v_Heritage.pdf [hereinafter Heritage Salmon]; United 
States Pub. Interest Research Group v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine at 3-15, No. 
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Aquaculture of transgenic salmon may pose enhanced or 
different risks to wild salmon, and it is not at all clear that the 
FDA has either the scientific competence or the inclination to 
consider those risks. 
1.  Transgenic Fish Might Become an Invasive Species 
The possible impact of escaped transgenic fish on wild 
populations is probably the greatest science-based concern 
raised by the new technology.  We already know from 
experience with conventional aquaculture that physical 
containment measures fail with disturbing frequency.172  
Conventional farmed salmon are an environmental nuisance 
                                                          
00-151-B-C, (D. Me. filed May 28, 2003), available at  
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/opinions/carter/ 
2003/GC_05282003_1-00cv151_USPIRG_v_AtlanticSal.pdf  [hereinafter 
USPIRG 2003].  Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 27-29, Int’l Tech. 
Ctr. v. Thompson, No. 1:04CV00062(RMU) (D.D.C. filed 2004); see also T.H. 
Pearson & K. D. Black, The Environmental Impacts of Marine Fish Cage 
Culture, in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF AQUACULTURE 1-31 (Kenneth D. 
Black ed., 2001).  Nutrient loading is, of course, a significant and widespread 
problem attributable to many causes in addition to aquaculture.  
Nevertheless, nutrient loading from aquaculture can have significant impacts 
on a local scale.  Proper rotation and fallow periods can minimize these effects 
over the long term.  Unfortunately, the industry’s track record with rotation 
and fallow periods is not very good.  USPIRG 2003, supra, at 14-18.   
In addition to organic wastes, fish farms also release a wide range of 
chemical pollutants including pesticides, antifoulants, and antibiotics.  The 
uncontrolled use of parasiticide drugs like cypermethrin to control sea lice 
infestations is particularly problematic because cypermethrin is highly toxic to 
many marine organisms.  Id. at 4-7.  Copper antifoulants are typically used to 
retard growth of organisms on the sea pen nets.  This copper leaches into the 
marine environment where it can be toxic to wild populations.  Id. at 6. 
 172. Alexandra Morton & John Volpe, A Description of Escaped Farmed 
Atlantic Salmon Salmo salar Captures and Their Characteristics in One 
Pacific Salmon Fishery Area in British Columbia, Canada, in 2000, 9 ALASKA 
FISHERY RES. BULL. 102 (2002).  The scope of the problem caused by escaping 
fish can be staggering.  More than 170,000 salmon escaped from a Maine 
salmon farm during one storm.  See Atlantic Salmon Fed’n, Catastrophic 
Salmon Escape Prompts Calls for Moratorium on the Aquaculture Industry 
(Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.asf.ca/Communications/ 
2001/feb/catastrophe.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).  Another 600,000 
escaped from a single incident in the Faroe Islands.  Jogvan Gardar, 600,000 
Faroese Salmon on the Run After Storms, INTRAFISH, Feb. 28, 2002, available 
at http://www.intrafish.com/article.php?articleID=21073&s= (last visited Mar. 
23, 2005).  Each year, approximately two million Atlantic salmon escape from 
aquaculture pens in the North Atlantic.  Helen Briggs, Farm Threat to Wild 
Salmon, BBC NEWS,  Oct. 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/innews /farmthreat2003.htm (last visited Mar. 
23, 2005). 
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upon escape, competing with wild salmon for food and mating 
opportunities and encroaching on the ecological niches of other 
species.  Transgenic fish that escape into natural ecosystems 
could pose a much bigger environmental threat.  This danger 
mainly arises for those transgenic fish endowed with new genes 
that improve such fitness traits like mating success or the 
ability to withstand harsh conditions.173 
Based on what is currently known about transgenic fish, it 
is impossible to adequately predict the environmental outcomes 
should these fish escape or be released to the wild.  There is 
little published information about whether or not adult 
transgenic fish are larger than their conventional counterparts 
(a variable that tends to relate directly to mating success) but 
at least one study has shown that transgenic fish modified to 
produce higher levels of GH not only grow more rapidly, but 
also grow to a larger size.174  The establishment of a thriving 
transgenic fish population in an ecosystem where it has never 
existed could crowd out native fish populations.  These dangers 
are only poorly understood and have yet to be thoroughly 
considered by any of the regulatory agencies charged with 
protecting and preserving the marine environment.  There 
simply is not yet enough information to predict when and 
where transgenic fish would be likely to become an invasive 
species. 
2.  Transgenic Fish Might Bear Trojan Genes 
Beyond these more general ecological effects, there are also 
real concerns about the effects of transgenic fish will have on 
the genetic diversity of wild populations.  A transgenic fish that 
has a survival advantage in the wild could out-compete its wild 
relatives.  For example, some experimental evidence suggests 
that transgenic coho salmon modified to express high levels of 
GH will be able to out-compete wild coho salmon for food.175  
Changes in the genetic make-up of well-adapted wild 
populations may ultimately affect their abilities to withstand 
environmental change. 
Even if transgenic animals cannot out-compete their wild 
                                                          
 173. Robert H. Devlin et al., Population Effects of Growth Hormone 
Transgenic Coho Salmon Depend on Food Availability and Genotype by 
Environment Interactions, 101 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9303, 9303 
(2004). 
 174. de la Fuente, supra note 152, at 89. 
 175. Devlin, supra note 152, at 479. 
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relatives, transgenic animals might detrimentally affect wild 
populations by introducing “exotic” genes into wild gene pools.  
Of particular concern is the so-called “Trojan Gene” effect, 
whereby transgenic animals that are poorly adapted for 
survival nonetheless have a mating advantage.176  For example, 
many transgenic fish have been modified to generate faster 
growth and/or larger size, traits typically associated with male 
mating success.177  These positive fitness traits are balanced by 
other characteristics, like reduced swimming speed,178 and 
aggressive food pursuit,179 that suggest the transgenic fish may 
have a long-term viability disadvantage.  This matrix of 
favorable reproductive traits and maladaptive pleiotrophic 
traits raise concerns that transgenic fish may introduce Trojan 
genes to their wild relatives—genes that increase mating 
success but decrease ultimate viability.  Such genes would 
reduce the mean fitness of the wild populations, and in extreme 
cases, might drive wild populations to extinction.  Possession of 
Trojan genes might enable transgenic fish to out-compete their 
conventional counterparts at breeding, thus reducing the 
overall fitness of the wild population.180 
At this point, there is evidence that non-transgenic farmed 
salmon exhibit characteristics which might predispose them to 
such Trojan gene effects, such as reduced survival of progeny 
                                                          
 176. Muir & Howard, Possible Ecological Risks, supra note 136, at 13,853.  
Muir applied this predictive model to GloFish and concluded that any released 
GloFish could not establish themselves in United States waters as an invasive 
species.  However, he cautioned, “In my opinion, these fish are safe.  But 
again, that's my opinion.”  GloFish Risk, SCIENCENTRAL NEWS, Dec. 23, 2003, 
available at http://www.sciencentral.com/ 
articles/view.php3?article_id=218392134&language=english (last visited Mar. 
23, 2005).  He also indicated the expectation that the FDA would conduct an 
independent analysis as to the safety of these fish before permitting their sale 
in interstate commerce.  Id. 
 177. Yoon Kwon Nam et al., Dramatically Accelerated Growth and 
Extraordinary Gigantism of Transgenic Mud Loach Misgurnus mizolepis, 10 
TRANSGENIC RES. 353 (2001): R.D. Howard et al., Mate Choice and Mate 
Competition Influence Male Body Size in Japanese Medaka, 55 ANIMAL 
BEHAV. 1151 (1998). 
 178. Anthony P. Farrell et al., Growth-Enhanced Transgenic Salmon Can 
Be Inferior Swimmers, 75 CAN. J. ZOOLOGY 335 (1997). 
 179. Elisabeth Jönsson et al., Growth Hormone Increases Predation 
Exposure of Rainbow Trout, 263 PROCEEDINGS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 647 (1996). 
 180. Muir & Howard, Possible Ecological Risks, supra note 136, at 13,853; 
Philip W. Hedrick, Invasion of Transgenes from Salmon or Other Genetically 
Modified Organisms into Natural Populations, 58 CAN. J. FISHERIES & 
AQUATIC SCI. 841, 841 (2001). 
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from farmed and wild salmon matings.181  When coupled with 
the growing body of evidence that transgenic fish may possess 
both the mating advantage and the viability disadvantage 
central to the Trojan gene scenario,182 this concern becomes 
pressing, particularly for the many salmon that are listed as 
threatened or endangered.    
The point is not that aquaculture of transgenic salmon will 
doom wild salmon to extinction, but that this is a big question 
mark—an unknown that must be carefully considered before 
the FDA makes any decision on Aqua Bounty’s application.  
The Trojan gene possibility is largely based on computer 
simulations of non-salmonid reproduction, and on 
extrapolations from behavioral studies.  Further study is 
clearly warranted before conclusions can be drawn.  The FDA’s 
willingness, based on a complete lack of evidence, to declare 
that GloFish posed no risks different from its unmodified 
counterparts, does not lend confidence that the FDA is up to 
this task. 
3.  Available Biological Containment Methods Do Not Solve 
this Problem 
In a landmark settlement of a Clean Water Act lawsuit 
brought by a coalition of public interest organizations, one fish 
farming company agreed to refrain from growing genetically 
engineered salmon strains in Maine.183  The same plaintiffs 
brought another federal lawsuit against other Maine 
aquaculture companies and obtained an injunction banning 
transgenic fish from Maine waters pending further safety 
                                                          
 181. Ian A. Fleming et al., Lifetime Success and Interactions of Farm 
Salmon Invading a Native Population, 267 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1517, 1517 
(2000); Philip McGinnity et al., Fitness Reduction and Potential Extinction of 
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with Escaped Farm Salmon, 270 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2443, 2443 (2003); P. 
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Environment, 54 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 998, 998 (1997) 
 182. See generally Hedrick, supra note 180; Richard D. Howard et al., 
Transgenic Male Mating Advantage Provides Opportunity for Trojan Gene 
Effect in a Fish, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2934 (2004).  
 183. Nat’l Envtl. Law Ctr., Federal Court Bans Frankenfish & Antibiotics: 
Judge Approves Landmark Settlement of Clean Water Act Lawsuit Against 
Heritage Salmon, Inc. (July 29, 2002), available at 
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research.184  In particular, the court ordered that biological 
containment mechanisms be explored.185 
Biological containment can reduce the risks to wild fish 
from escapees.  In the context of aquaculture, biological 
containment typically means raising sterile triploid fish or 
sterile transgenic fish carrying anti-fertility genes tailored into 
their genomes.186  Sterilization techniques are relatively easy 
and inexpensive, but success rates are highly variable. There is 
an overwhelming consensus, even among advocates of this 
technology that neither perfect containment nor 100% 
sterilization of GM fish will be possible.187  For example, 
Yorktown Technology initially claimed that GloFish were 
triploid and therefore sterile.  However, press reports of fertile 
GloFish reproducing are not uncommon.188 
Given the huge numbers of fish in commercial aquaculture 
operations, typically hundreds of thousands per pen, and the 
concomitant large numbers of escapees, even a small 
percentage of residually fertile transgenic fish might be enough 
to pose all the threats of crossbreeding.189  In addition, even 
                                                          
 184. USPIRG, supra note 171, at 42-43. 
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http://www.nbiap.vt.edu/brarg/brasym96/sutterlin96.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 
2005). 
 188. See, e.g., Dawn Fallilk, supra note 38, at A1. 
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effective sterilization will not necessarily neutralize the risks to 
wild populations.  Escaped, sterile fish might still engage in 
courtship and spawning behavior, and therefore disrupt 
breeding in wild populations and decrease overall reproductive 
success. Even without reproducing, waves of escaped sterile 
fish could also create ecological disruptions by competing with 
wild fish. If transgenic fish have a competitive advantage, wild 
fish will be overwhelmed as each sterile escapee cohort is 
replaced by another equally strong cohort.  Transgenic fish that 
do not have a competitive advantage would still stress fragile 
marine ecosystems through their sheer numbers.  Again, the 
FDA’s GloFish decision does not generate confidence that the 
FDA will fully consider these concerns. 
4.  Transgenic Salmon Might Have an Enhanced Ability to 
Transfer Disease 
Genetic engineering has also focused on increasing 
resistance of fish to pathogens.190  The possibility of increased 
resistance is of obvious commercial interest.  However, it does 
raise an additional environmental concern.  Transgenic fish 
might act as reservoirs for diseases and parasites to which they 
are resistant—thereby increasing the risk of transferring 
diseases and/or parasites to wild populations.191 
Aquaculture already creates disease reservoirs.192  For 
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PARASITOLOGY 41 (1999). 
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example, sea lice infestations are endemic in most areas with 
intensive salmon culture.193  Salmon farms have been 
correlated with a more than three-fold increase in abundance of 
lice infestations of wild fish.194  When salmon farms are 
situated along salmon migration routes, or in wild salmon 
habitats, the results can be devastating to already-endangered 
wild populations.  For example, major sea lice infestations in 
British Columbia have been correlated with significant 
decreases in numbers of fish returning to spawn,195 and are 
believed to be responsible for the catastrophic collapse of the 
wild sea trout population.196  Bacterial and viral diseases like 
infectious salmon anemia also run rampant in fish farms and 
can infect wild populations.197 
In conventional aquaculture, the disease reservoir risk 
posed by aquaculture is necessarily limited by the possibility 
that the disease will kill its host fish.  Creating transgenic fish 
immune to the disease would increase the risk dramatically 
because infected fish could serve as hosts for the infectious 
agent without expressing any of the negative manifestations of 
the disease.  Infected transgenic fish could persist for long 
periods of time, thus spreading the infection or disease. 
CONCLUSION: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? 
The status quo resembles a vacuum more than it does a 
coherent and functional regulatory scheme.  States have been 
stepping in to fill that vacuum, and, have imposed a growing 
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array of restrictions on transgenic fish.198  State regulation is 
an imperfect response to this problem.  Indeed many of those 
commenting on California’s GloFish ban point out how easily 
residents can acquire the fish from neighboring states.199  
Piecemeal state regulation also raises the specter of 
inconsistent obligations that might make marketing the 
products of biotechnology nearly impossible.  National 
standards are necessary. 
 To forestall inconsistent state regulation, to promote 
confidence in the technology, and most importantly, to protect 
human health and the environment, we must develop a sound, 
transparent, and credible method for evaluating the 
environmental risks associated with transgenic fish.  A 
consistent program of risk assessment is necessary.  Scientists 
have already developed the beginnings of a reasonable model 
for such a risk assessment.200  This system is far from perfect 
but could be the starting point for a scientifically sound agency 
risk evaluation of genetically modified fish.  In order for that to 
occur, the FDA must live up to its statutory role and must 
resolve any conflicts between its statutory mandates and the 
Coordinated Framework in favor of fully implementing its 
statutory mandates.  
 The Coordinated Framework must also be reconsidered, 
either by the President and the Executive Branch itself or 
through legislative action.  In particular, it is time to rethink 
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the decision to make the FDA lead agency for regulating 
transgenic fish (and other animals).  Because many of the most 
critical issues with regard to transgenic fish are environmental, 
they do not naturally fall within the FDA’s scope of authority.   
 The situation cries out for congressional clarification of 
how transgenic animals should be regulated.  Ideally Congress 
would decide to channel regulatory decisions to the EPA and 
Fish and Wildlife Service—agencies with some expertise in 
assessing environmental safety and risks. However, the FDA 
must not wait for Congress or the President before undertaking 
its own rethinking of how it approaches transgenic animals.  
For starters, the FDA should ensure that it fully exercises its 
statutory mandates under FDCA and NEPA.  Through proper 
interpretation of its statutory mandates, the FDA can ensure 
that every transgenic animal is subject to a rigorous new 
animal drug scrutiny, and can make environmental effects of 
these transgenic animals a central consideration in the 
regulatory analysis.  The FDA should make it clear that, at 
least at the beginning when there are so many unknowns, 
every transgenic animal will be subject to stringent 
environmental and human health assessments. The many 
unanswered environmental questions posed in this article and 
elsewhere can provide a starting point for the FDA’s thorough 
and public consideration of any NAD applications it may 
receive.  Only then will the environmental risks posed by this 
technology be addressed and public mistrust assuaged. 
 
